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Povzetek
Naslov: Eksperimentalno ovrednotenje nasprotnǐskih primerov in načinov
obrambe
V tem delu opravimo eksperimentalno analizo in evalvacijo različnih me-
tod generiranja nasprotnǐskih primerov oz. evalviramo njihove vplive na
različne tipe klasifikatorjev slik. Namen analize je bil pridobiti čim več zna-
nja o nasprotnǐskih primerih. Metode ustvarjanja nasprotnǐskih primerov je
zahtevno primerjati, ker vse uporabljajo drugačne tipe parametrov. Da se
znebimo skrbi glede določanja optimalnih parametrov, uvedemo točnostno-
perturbacijsko krivuljo, s katero lahko veliko bolj natančno ocenimo, koliko je
klasifikator robusten pri obrambi oz. koliko je generator nasprotnǐskih prime-
rov uspešen pri napadu. S to krivuljo smo analizirali tudi obrambno metodo
učenja na nasprotnǐskih primerih. Rezultati kažejo, da so mreže z radialnimi
baznimi funkcijami naravno bolj robustne proti takšnim napadom, tudi če v
večini primerov niso primerne za klasifikacijo slik. Opazili smo še šibko kore-
lacijo med zmožnostjo generalizacije klasifikatorjev ter njihovo odpornostjo
pred nasprotnǐskimi primeri.
Ključne besede
nasprotnǐski primeri, nevronske mreže, globoko učenje, klasifikacija slik

Abstract
Title: An experimental evaluation of adversarial examples and methods of
defense
In this thesis we perform an experimental analysis and evaluation of dif-
ferent methods for creating adversarial examples, and learn how these affect
different types of image classifiers, with the intent to obtain a better un-
derstanding of adversarial examples. The adversarial methods are hard to
compare, since they use different types of parameters. We introduce a novel
visualization technique, called accuracy-perturbation curve, that allows us
to perform our comparison much more in depth, without the need to find
optimal parameters. With this technique we also evaluate the successful-
ness of adversarial training as a defensive method. The results showed that
radial basis function network classifiers possess an intrinsic property that
makes them stronger on adversarial examples, compared to other classifiers,
like CNNs, even though they perform poorly on clean images. Also, we no-
ticed a weak correlation between the classifiers ability to generalize and its
robustness against attacks.
Keywords
adversarial examples, neural networks, deep learning, image classification

Razširjeni povzetek
I Uvod
Z velikim izbolǰsanjem računske zmogljivosti grafičnih procesnih enot, ogro-
mnim povečanjem količine informacij, ki smo jih začeli hraniti z nastopom
dobe interneta, ter z velikim raziskovalnim napredkom na področju stroj-
nega učenja v zadnjih letih, smo priča novemu zagonu uporabe globokih ne-
vronskih mrež za različne potrebe na raziskovalnem področju in v industriji.
Takšne implementacije so ponavadi veliko bolǰse od drugih rešitev, zato se
jih pogosto uporablja na področju računalnǐskega vida, prepoznave govora,
umetne inteligence ter na drugih področjih. Velikokrat so takšne rešitve tudi
konkurenčne človeškim sposobnostim [1, 2].
S takšnim ogromnim porastom uporabe nevronskih mrež in strojnega
učenja na splošno se moramo zavedati tudi varnostnih hib takšnih rešitev.
Ene večjih nevarnosti, ki pretijo nevronskim mrežam ter drugim rešitvam
strojnega učenja, so tako imenovani nasprotnǐski primeri (ang. adversarial
examples). To so neopazno popačeni vhodni podatki, spremenjeni z name-
nom zmesti nevronsko mrežo. Izkaže se, da je takšne primere zelo lahko ge-
nerirati, so ponavadi neopazni človeškemu opazovalcu, skoraj vedno zmedejo
napadenega, obramba pred njimi pa je zelo zahtevna. Zato je raziskovanje
na tem področju nujno, še posebej, ker se rešitve z nevronskimi mrežami
vedno bolj pogosto pojavljajo na varnostno občutljivih področjih, na primer
pri detekciji zlonamerne programske opreme ali pa pri avtonomnih vozilih.
Nasprotnǐske primere so najprej opazili na klasifikatorjih slik, zato se
i
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bomo temu tudi mi posvetili pri naši analizi. Na Sliki 1.1 sta prikazana dva
zgleda nasprotnǐskih primerov, na katerih je naš slikovni klasifikator popol-
noma odpovedal.
V predhodnih delih se je ovrednotenje metod napada ali obrambe opra-
vljalo dokaj posplošeno, brez velikega posvečanja rigorozni primerjavi. Zato
v našem delu opravimo analizo in primerjavo različnih metod napada ter
tipov klasifikatorjev slik. Za bolǰso analizo robustnosti klasifikatorjev proti
nasprotnǐskim primerom uvedemo novo metodo ocene, ki jo poimenujemo
točnostno-perturbacijska krivulja. Ta nam omogoči oceno robustnosti klasi-
fikatorja pri točno določeni magnitudi perturbacije.
II Kratek pregled sorodnih del
Nasprotnǐske primere so prvi odkrili Szegedy et. al. [3]. Njihova metoda je
bila uspešna, vendar pa nekoliko počasna. Goodfellow et. al. [4] so posta-
vili hipotezo, da nasprotnǐski primeri izhajajo iz linearnosti nevronskih mrež
tako, da so občutljivi tudi enostavneǰsi razvrščevalniki, kot na primer logi-
stična regresija. Iz te razlage so razvili novo metodo za ustvarjanje naspro-
tnǐskih primerov, ki ne deluje iterativno, zaradi česar je zelo hitra. Poimeno-
vali so jo hitra gradientna signum metoda (ang. fast gradient sign method),
njena pomanjkljivost pa je, da ustvari večje in manj uspešne perturbacije.
Za njo so prǐsle še druge iterativne metode, na primer osnovna iterativna
metoda [5] (ang. basic iterative method), ki izvira iz hitre gradientne, ali pa
DeepFool [6], ki deluje po principu iskanja odločitvenih mej klasifikatorjev.
Ko najde najbližjo, jo preskoči ter povzroči napačno razvrstitev. V našem
delu se bomo posvetili tem trem metodam napada.
Kot smo že omenili, je obramba pred nasprotnǐskimi primeri veliko težji
zalogaj. Ena od metod je nasprotnǐsko učenje (ang. adversarial training),
kjer že naučeni klasifikator naprej učimo še na nasprotnǐskih primerih, ustvar-
jenih za njegov napad. Predhodne raziskave so pokazale, da takšna metoda
včasih deluje, včasih celo kot nekakšna metoda regularizacije [3, 4, 6].
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Poleg napadov na klasifikatorje slik so bili nasprotnǐski primeri upora-
bljeni tudi pri segmentaciji slik [7], prepoznavi obrazov [8] ter pametnih vo-
zilih [9].
III Nasprotnǐski primeri
Generiranje nasprotnǐskih primerov je optimizacijski problem. Minimizirati
želimo velikost perturbacije pod pogojem, da klasifikator narobe razvrsti sliko
z dodano klasifikacijo ter da vrednosti slikovnih elementov perturbirane slike
ne padejo ven iz svojega definicijskega območja, glej Enačbo (3.1). Optimalno
rešitev takšnega problema je težko najti, ker se ukvarjamo z visoko nelinear-
nimi sistemi. Običajno se iskanja lotimo z bolj hevrističnimi rešitvami.
Pri eksperimentalnem ovrednotenju smo uporabili tri metode za ustvar-
janje nasprotnǐskih primerov, hitro gradientno signum metodo (FGSM) [4],
osnovno iterativno metodo (BIM) [5] ter metodo DeepFool [6].
FGSM deluje na principu vǐsanja vrednosti funkcije izgube klasifikatorja.
Cenovno funkcijo linearno razvijemo po vhodni sliki ter opravimo en korak
gradientnega dviga, da izgubo zvǐsamo. Metodo smo prikazali z Algorit-
mom 1. Pri vsaki opravljeni perturbaciji slike moramo biti še posebej pozorni,
da nam vrednosti slikovnih elementov ne uidejo izven njihovega definicijskega
območja (npr. [0, 1]).
Osnovna iterativna metoda deluje na podobnem principu kot FGSM, le
da korak hitre gradientne signum metode ponovimo večkrat. Pri tem seveda
lahko iteriramo z manǰsimi koraki ter dosežemo bolj fine popačitve. Metoda
je prikazana z Algoritmom 2.
Metoda DeepFool je malo bolj dovršena kot preǰsnji dve. Ta poskuša
najti odločitvene hiper-ravnine razvrščevalnika s pomočjo linearnega razvoja
njegovega izhoda. S pomočjo razvoja izračuna grobo oceno točke, kjer je
razvrščevalnik neodločen glede dveh ali več razredov, ter se postavi tja. Ta
korak večkrat ponovi, dokler res ne pade na dejansko odločitveno mejo. S
preskokom te meje je našel novi nasprotnǐski primer. Metoda je bolj po-
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drobno predstavljena v Algoritmu 3.
Med eksperimenti smo ovrednotili še metodo obrambe imenovano na-
sprotnǐsko učenje. Tu klasifikatorju ustvarimo nasprotnǐske primere in jih
vstavimo nazaj v njegovo učno množico v upanju, da se jim bo klasifikator
prilagodil ter postal bolj robusten.
IV Eksperimentalna evalvacija
Eksperimentalno analizo smo opravili s tremi metodami napada, FGSM, BIM
ter z metodo DeepFool. Poleg tega smo pri metodah FGSM in BIM upora-
bili tri načine napada, odvisno od tega kakšen cilj napačne razvrstitve smo
želeli doseči. Pri prvem načinu smo poskušali le zmesti trenutno napoved
klasifikatorja (ang. untargeted mode without supplied true class label), pri
drugem smo enako poskušali le zmesti klasifikator, le da smo tu napadu po-
dali pravilno oznako razreda (ang. untargeted mode with supplied true class
labels), cilj zadnjega načina pa je bil, da klasifikator razvrsti nasprotnǐski
primer v določen razred. Bolj specifično, želeli smo, da nasprotnǐski primer
razvrsti v razred, ki bi bil najmanj verjeten pri originalni sliki (ang. targeted
least-likely mode).
Z nasprotnǐskimi primeri smo napadali različne tipe razvrščevalnikov. To
so bili logistična regresija, nevronska mreža s popolno povezanimi nivoji,
nekaj konvolucijskih nevronskih mrež različnih velikosti ter nekaj različnih
tipov mrež z radialnimi baznimi funkcijami.
Uporabili smo označeni množici slik MNIST [10] in CIFAR10 [11]. Prva
vsebuje slike ročno napisanih števk, medtem ko druga prikazuje označene
slike različnih objektov. Te so letalo, avtomobil, ptica, mačka, srna, pes,
žaba, konj, ladja in tovornjak. Zaradi velikega števila potrebnih eksperimen-
tov, zbirk z večjimi slikami nismo uporabili.
Vsaka metoda za tvorbo nasprotnǐskih primerov uporablja različne pa-
rametre. Hitri metodi določa parameter eps, ki nam pove, kako velike
popačitve bo naredila. Osnovni iterativni metodi določa parameter nb iter
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število korakov, eps iter magnitudo vsakega koraka ter eps največjo dovo-
ljeno magnitudo perturbacije. DeepFool pa uravnavamo z največjim dovolje-
nim številom korakov max iter ter velikostjo zadnjega skoka čez odločitveno
hiper-ravnino overshoot.
Vsaki metodi je težko določiti optimalne parametre, še posebej, ker se
moramo pogosto odločiti pri kompromisu med visoko uspešnostjo napada ali
majhno velikostjo perturbacije. Da se znebimo potrebe po iskanju primernih
parametrov, poženemo eksperiment na več različnih kombinacijah teh para-
metrov. Iz vsakega zagona dobimo klasifikacijsko točnost razvrščevalnika na
nasprotnǐskih primerih in povprečno “perturbacijo slike”, pri računanju te
vsako perturbacijo normaliziramo z magnitudo originalne slike (Enačba 4.1).
Vsak par klasifikacijske točnosti ter velikosti perturbacije narǐsemo kot točko
v grafu odvisnosti točnosti od perturbacije. S tem dobimo oceno o
učinkovitosti nasprotnǐskih primerov na klasifikatorju pri določeni magnitudi
perturbacij. Takšno krivuljo poimenujemo točnostno-perturbacijska krivu-
lja. Včasih so točke na takšnih grafih zelo raztresene, kar oteži primerjavo
različnih krivulj. Da jih lažje primerjamo, dodamo, kjer je potrebno, še
spodnjo in zgornjo ovojnico na raztresene točke. Te izračunamo s pomočjo
Algoritma 4, katerega smo razvili za ta namen. Pri ovrednotenju se osre-
dotočamo le na spodnjo ovojnico, ki nam služi kot najslabša možna obramba
pred napadom (ang. worst-case example). V Sliki 4.3 prikažemo primere
takšnih krivulj ter njihovih ovojnic, če so točke na grafu raztresene.
V Tabelah 5.1 in 5.2 smo prikazali klasifikacijske točnosti naših
razvrščevalnikov na čistih slikah. Večje konvolucijske nevronske mreže se bo-
lje obnesejo na obeh množicah slik, kar ni presenetljivo, saj so konvolucijski
sloji bolj primerni za analizo slik. Rezultati kažejo, da so napadi, kjer podamo
pravilne oznake razredov slik, najbolj uspešni. Recimo pri metodi DeepFool,
ki samo poskuša spremeniti napoved razvrščevalnika, se lahko zgodi, da z
dodano perturbacijo povzročimo, da razvrščevalnik pravilno razvrsti sliko, ki
jo je originalno napačno označil. Zaradi tega se lahko klasicikacijska točnost
nekoliko dvigne, tudi če je metoda napada močna.
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Pri razvrščevalnikih slik MNIST točnostno-perturbacijske krivulje kažejo,
da se velike konvolucijske mreže bolje obnesejo pri robustnosti proti naspro-
tnǐskim primerom, kot na primer enostavneǰsa polno povezana nevronska
mreža (MLP) ali pa osnovna logistična regresija (LR). Točnostno-perturbacijske
krivulje konvolucijskih mrež kažejo na padec točnosti pri večjih perturbaci-
jah slik kot enostavneǰsi modeli. To nakazuje na povezavo med robustnostjo
modelov proti nasprotnǐskim primerom ter njihovo zmožnostjo dobrega ge-
neraliziranja med slikami. Med temi razvrščevalniki izstopajo mreže z radi-
alnimi baznimi funkcijami. Originalno te ne generalizirajo dobro, saj zaradi
njihove občutljivosti na transformacije niso najbolj primerne za klasifikacijo
slik. Kljub temu se obnesejo na nasprotnǐskih primerih tako dobro kot kon-
volucijske nevronske mreže. To izvira iz občutljivosti radialnih baznih funkcij
na odmike od njihovih centrov oz. značilnih slik.
Rezultati robustnosti razvrščevalnikov CIFAR10 slik ne kažejo lastnosti,
da so metode, ki dobro generalizirajo, tudi bolje odporne. Recimo, konvo-
lucijska nevronska mreža CNN3, ki je imela najvǐsjo točnost na čistih slikah,
se pri metodah BIM in DeepFool najslabše obnese, saj njena klasifikacijska
točnost najhitreje pade pri večanju perturbacije slike. To je mogoče le po-
sledica slabo naučenih modelov, saj najbolǰsi doseže le 76% klasifikacijske
točnosti. Tu ne moremo govoriti o dovolj dobri sposobnosti generalizacije.
Kot pri modelih za slike MNIST se tudi modeli z radialnimi baznimi funkci-
jami za CIFAR10 množico obnesejo bolje od drugih.
Na eni od konvolucijskih nevronskih mrež smo med seboj primerjali tudi
tri obravnavane napade. Metoda DeepFool se je izkazala za najučinkoviteǰso,
saj je tvorila uspešne nasprotnǐske primere, ki so imeli tudi za cel red manǰso
perturbacijo slik od metode hitrega gradienta ali osnovne iterativne metode.
To ni zelo presenetljivo, saj se metoda DeepFool loti tvorjenja nasprotnǐskih
primerov veliko bolj rigorozno od drugih dveh, ki samo vǐsata vrednost ce-
novne funkcije.
Pregledali smo tudi, kako se klasifikacijski modeli obnesejo po njihovem
učenju na nasprotnǐskih primerih. Naša analiza učenja je pokazala, da je
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potrebno modelu po vsaki epohi posodobiti množico nasprotnǐskih prime-
rov z novimi, ustvarjenimi na najnoveǰsi različici klasifikatorja. Točnostno-
perturbacijske krivulje za nasprotnǐsko naučene modele kažejo pozitiven re-
zultat. V vseh primerih se je robustnost modelov dvignila, saj so potrebovali
večje magnitude perturbacije, da se je pojavil padec točnosti na nasprotnǐskih
primerih. V nekaterih primerih smo bili priča popolni robustnosti nad na-
sprotnǐskimi primeri tipa BIM, ko smo CIFAR10 model CNN3 nasprotnǐsko
naučili na perturbacijah, ustvarjenih z isto metodo BIM.
V Sklep
V tem delu smo podrobno ovrednotili metode za tvorbo nasprotnǐskih prime-
rov, obnašanje različnih klasifikatorjev slik pri takšnih napadih in pregledali,
kako se obnese obramba z učenjem na nasprotnǐskih primerih. Za bolǰso
predstavo robustnosti razvrščevalnikov na nasprotnǐskih primerih smo uvedli
novo točnostno-perturbacijsko krivuljo, ki prikaže točnost klasifikatorja na
nasprotnǐskih primerih v odvisnosti od velikosti popačitve teh primerov.
Med razvrščevalniki so se dobro obnesle mreže z radialnimi baznimi funk-
cijami, ki so pokazale vǐsjo robustnost pri slikah MNIST in CIFAR10. Pri
razvrščevalnikih slik MNIST so se bolje obnesli tisti, ki so imeli tudi bolǰso
klasifikacijsko točnost na čistih slikah. Ta lastnost ni bila prisotna pri re-
zultatih ovrednotenja napada na CIFAR10 razvrščevalnike. Med temi so se
slabo obnesli tudi originalno dobri modeli. Ta neskladnost je mogoče le po-
sledica že tako slabo naučenih modelov na slikah CIFAR10, saj so dosegli
kvečjemu točnost 76%. Za bolǰso analizo bi bilo bolje ovrednotiti močneǰse
CIFAR10 razvrščevalnike.
Točnostno-perturbacijske krivulje so pokazale tudi, da nadaljnje učenje na
nasprotnǐskih primerih resnično pomaga pri povečanju robustnosti
razvrščevalnih modelov.
Pomemben prispevek tega dela so točnostno-perturbacijske krivulje, na
katerih bi lahko izvedli nadaljnje raziskovalno delo. Recimo, zanimivo bi bilo
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poskusiti z njimi določiti kakšno številsko mero, ki oceni robustnost klasifi-
katorja. Na primer, lahko bi iz krivulje določili najmanǰso možno velikost
perturbacije, ki bi povzročila 50% padec klasifikacijske točnosti. S tem bi
lažje primerjali robustnosti razvrščevalnikov. Vsekakor so se te krivulje izka-
zale za dobro metodo ovrednotenja robustnosti, zato menimo, da bi jih bilo
koristno uporabiti pri nadaljnjih ocenah novih metod tvorbe nasprotnǐskih
primerov ter obramb proti njim.
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
With the massive increase in computing powers of GPUs, the amount of in-
formation we started to collect in the internet age, and with new research
done, we saw a rebirth of the use of artificial neural networks in machine
learning tasks. With this greater computing power we could train much
larger, deeper, and more complex neural network structures, bringing a new
field of machine learning called deep learning. Training deep neural networks
has brought ground breaking results and has been used in many academic
and industry fields, for example in computer vision, speech recognition and
sentiment analysis, artificial intelligence, and more, beating even human ca-
pabilities in some applications, for example in image classification [1] or in
playing various games [2].
As more and more software applications implement deep learning solu-
tions we need to think about the security of these products, especially in
fields where their security and reliability is critical. For example, the au-
tomobile industry is racing as to who will design the first self-driving car.
These have to use some kind of deep learning implementations to handle
the driving AI, or the cars awareness of its environment, for example the
detection of traffic-signs [12]. Deep neural network solutions have also been
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
used in facial recognition, which has become a standard in unlocking our
cellphones [13, 14, 15]. We also saw a rise in machine learning detection
of malware [16, 17, 18], where it is also crucial that the implementations
perform optimally.
Unfortunately, deep learning implementations did not come without prob-
lems. These types of neural networks are usually described as black-boxes.
By having many layers and neurons in them we loose the ability to interpret
their inner workings.
Even more worrisome was the observation from Szegedy et. al. [3], where
they showed that artificial neural networks can be easily fooled by crafting
so called adversarial examples, i.e., slightly perturbed input data. The topic
of adversarial examples has been researched quite extensively [4, 5, 6], and
these types of attacking scenarios have been used in many different areas of
machine learning, in image classification [3, 4, 5, 6, 19], facial recognition [8],
image segmentation [7], artificial intelligence [20, 21], and intelligent vehicles
[9]. This should cause a great concern, since deep learning solutions have
nowadays become widespread, and more and more solutions are susceptible
to such attacks. Maybe forcing an object detection classifier in a cellphone to
misclassify wouldn’t bring catastrophic results, but an autonomous vehicle
mistaking a stop-sign for a one way sign certainly could.
Deep neural networks are usually described with the property that they
generalize well. Meaning that, for example, if a well trained neural network
can correctly classify an image, then it should also correctly classify a similar
image. If the generalization ability of a classifier is high, then small imper-
ceptible differences in the image shouldn’t confuse it. This has largely been
the case, but adversarial examples attacks uncovered holes in the classifiers’
understanding of the data. By carefully constructing these perturbations
that can be imperceptible to a human observer, we can make the classifier
misclassify images, and drastically increase its error-rate, even to 100%. In
Figure 1.1 we show two such adversarial examples. One made a classifier of
written digits think that a image of a 7 represented a number 3, while the
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other case shows a different classifier mistake a truck for a horse.
Because of this vulnerability, neural network classifiers have been de-
scribed as a Potemkin village [4], where their beautiful “facade” performs
very good on natural data, but looking at them from anther angle, by artifi-
cially perturbing their inputs, we get a different view that is less pleasant.
Predicted: 7
Confidence: 99.9%
Predicted: 3
Confidence: 49.9%
(a) MNIST example
Predicted: truck
Confidence: 100.0%
Predicted: horse
Confidence: 49.1%
(b) CIFAR10 example
Figure 1.1: Examples of an adversarial attack using the DeepFool method
on two images. On the left we show the original image, in the center we show
the magnified perturbation, and on the right is shown the final adversarial
example. Along with the old and new prediction we also show the classifiers
confidence.
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1.2 Related work
Szegedy et. al. [3] were the first to discover and coin the term adversarial
examples. They find the examples with the L-BFGS box-constrained mini-
mizer, which was very computationally intensive. Although their algorithm
took a lot of time to compute the adversarial examples, they reported 100%
error rates and imperceptible perturbations to a human observer.
Goodfellow et. al. [4], introduced a much faster method of generating
adversarial examples named the “fast gradient sign method” (FGSM), which
was not iterative, so it computed a perturbation much quicker that the L-
BFGS method, but that also meant that its perturbation and success was
worse. Kurakin et. al. [5] introduced an iterative version of the FGSM, the
“basic iterative method” (BIM). This allowed them to produce much smaller
and stronger perturbations, by still retaining a level of speed in comparison to
the L-BFGS. Another method of creating adversarial examples was created
by Moosavi-Dezfooli et. al. [6] called DeepFool. They have solved the problem
by linearizing the classifier to find its decision boundaries. By finding the
closest boundary to the original image, they could jump over it and produce
an adversarial example. DeepFool produced an order smaller perturbations
than FGSM and BIM, but still computed its adversarial example in similar
time to BIM. We will further inspect and compare these methods in this
thesis.
Some research has also been made in trying to defend classifiers against
adversarial examples. By training the classifiers further on adversarial per-
turbations the classifiers can become more robust against them [3], [4], [6].
Distillation of classifiers has also been used in increasing a models robustness
against the attacks [22], but later work showed an attack that could easily
fool this defense also [23].
Adversarial examples aren’t only successful on digital images fed directly
into the classifier. Kurakin et. al. have shown that even printing them on
paper, and feeding them to a neural network classifier by capturing it by
a cell-phone camera, can still confuse a classifier. Most of the time, when
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dealing with image classification, we aren’t capturing 2D photographs that
we want to classify, but real-world objects or human faces. Brown et. al. [19]
fooled classifiers by placing so called adversarial patches next to objects. An
adversarial patch is a universal sticker that can target any scene. It does not
bother with trying to minimally perturb, but hopes the sticker would look
inconspicuous to a human observer, seeing it as an “art piece”. Sharif et. al.
[8] created physical eyeglasses frames with adversarial perturbations on them
that fooled face recognition classifiers. Eykholt et. al. [9] produce adversarial
examples for traffic signs in the form ob black and white rectangular stickers,
that worked in a real world scenario.
Adversarial examples aren’t necessarily bound to image classification tasks.
Metzen et. al. [7] apply these principles to image segmentation. They man-
aged to obtain universal adversarial perturbations, that produced a desired
segmentation output, unrelated to the scene attacked. They also managed
to produce perturbations that could remove a target class, for example a
pedestrian on a street. Huang et. al. [20] and Kos et. al. [21] apply adversar-
ial examples to neural network policies in reinforcement learning where they
add perturbation to the user interface output of the game, to which their
policy network also has access. Kos et. al. [21] managed to fool networks
playing a game of Atari Pong, while Huang et. al. [20] also had success on
other games like Space Invaders. Tabacof et. al. [24] and Kos et. al. [25] also
attacked generative models, more specifically variational auto-encoders. By
adding perturbations to an input image, the decoder returned a completely
different image to the original. Tabacof et. al. [24] construct these examples
by attacking the latent representation of the image, striving to produce a
latent representation of the adversarial example as close as possible to the
targets.
There has also been other research related to adversarial examples. For
example, Hendrycks et. al. [26] scanned the Flickr and iNaturalist websites
and found natural adversarial examples that were hard to classify, even for
top performing ImageNet classifiers. These examples were unperturbed im-
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ages and selected in such a way that their attack success transferred to other
classifiers, meaning that they had features in them that were naturally hard
for machine learning classifiers to understand, showing that the classifiers
tend to rely too much on texture, for example. Unrelated to adversarial
examples, Carter et. al. [27] worked on the visualization of a classifier’s ac-
tivations and from these they managed to find its weaknesses. For example,
they found that the network dealt with the stitching in baseballs and the
teeth of great white sharks similarly. By inserting an image of a baseball
onto an image of a grey whale the network got confused and classified the
modified image as a great white shark.
A similar concept related to adversarial examples are images that humans
wouldn’t classify into any class, but the artificial classifier would. On such out
of distribution examples, a classifier using a categorical distribution should
output uniform probability to each class, indicating confusion. Goodfellow
et. al. [4] create such images, which they name “rubbish class examples”, by
only sampling them from a normal distribution N (0, IN), where N is the
dimension of the image. They report that neural network type classifiers
fail on such examples, outputting non-uniform distribution over the classes,
while radial basis function networks performed much better. Even further,
by adding perturbation using their fast gradient sign method to these random
samples, they managed to make the classifier predict any class they wanted.
Qiu et. al. [28] reviewed the recent studies on adversarial examples. They
categorize the different attack scenarios, such as white-box and black-box
attacks, list and describe different fundamental methods of attack, such as
FGSM and BIM, show different applications where adversarial examples have
been used, and review different methods designed to defend the classifiers
from adversarial examples.
While Qui et. al. reviewed the field of adversarial examples in its breadth,
listing and describing the current methods, we set out to experimentally eval-
uate and compare different methods of attack on image classifiers, review how
different types of classifiers perform on adversarial examples and experimen-
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tally evaluate how a defense method called adversarial training performs. We
focused on image classification, as adversarial examples originated from this
field and most of the fundamental research is done here.
1.3 Contributions
We set out to rigorously compare different attack methods and their per-
formance on multiple types of classification models, since we feel that not
enough work has been done on such experimental comparisons. For this, we
selected three methods of attack, FGSM, BIM and DeepFool. These meth-
ods are used to adversarially attack a logistic regression model, a multilayer
perceptron, convolutional neural networks, and radial basis function network
classifiers. The radial basis functions have been used because they might be
naturally robust against adversarial examples, since they give a disadvantage
to inputs that are far away from the modes of natural dataset distribution
[4]. The question is if they are sensitive enough to distinguish adversarial
examples from natural images.
The classifiers are systematically tested against all methods of attack, and
compared between each other, to obtain a general overview of what types are
more or less robust against adversarial examples.
We use the MNIST [10] and the CIFAR10 [11] image datasets, where the
former consisted of labeled images of written digits, while the latter included
labeled images of ten different classes, such as airplanes, horses, dogs, ect.
The methods of attack use different parameters that dictate their be-
haviour. Most of the time it is difficult to determine the optimal parameters,
because we usually end up having to do a trade-off between the size of the ad-
versarial perturbation and the attack success. In order to liberate ourselves
from having to choose the parameters of each attack method we introduce a
novel accuracy-perturbation plot, that combines multiple combinations of pa-
rameters to construct a type of “efficiency curve” for a given classifier. This
curve gives us an estimate of how well the classifier performs at a certain
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perturbation magnitude of the constructed adversarial examples.
We also experimentally examine adversarial training. This is a method of
defense against adversarial examples, where the classifier is further trained on
adversarially perturbed images. We show if the newly trained models become
more robust against the attacks in comparison to their original states, also
with the help of the accuracy-perturbation curve.
1.4 Thesis structure
In Chapter 2 we describe the groundwork theory on classification. This in-
cludes an explanation of the different classification models we use and how
they are trained. In Chapter 3 we define adversarial examples and introduce
the three methods of attack we will use. Additionally we introduce the adver-
sarial training method. Chapter 4 includes details of the experimental setup
we needed to do to perform our experimental evaluations. This includes a
description of the image datasets we used, an overview of the architectures
and learning parameters of the classification models we used, and the intro-
duction of the accuracy-perturbation curve. In Chapter 5 we list and discuss
our results, roughly determine the top performing classifiers and inspect in
detail the adversarial training method, how it is best used and show improve-
ments in the robustness of classifiers trained with it. Finally, we discuss our
results and the possibilities for further work in Chapter 6.
Chapter 2
Classification
Classification is a large subsection of problems that machine learning deals
with. Specifically, we are given an observation with multiple features, lets
say x, and we need to assign this observation to a class. We perform an
operation of C(x), obtaining a class label, which should be the same as the
true class label of the image, C∗(x).
In this thesis we will be focusing on image classification, which means
that we are given a set of images, where each image can be described by one
label from a set of many. This problem can be best solved if we already have
some set of labeled examples on which we build or train our classifier in a
supervised manner. Classification can deal with binary classes, such as true
or false, or multiple classes such as in the case of digit prediction.
2.1 Multinomial logistic regression
One of the simplest classification models is logistic regression or multinomial
logistic regression, if adapted for the case of multiple possible classes. It can
be viewed as linear regression, but modified to perform as a classifier. Linear
regression transforms observations continuously via an affine transformation.
In the case of logistic regression, we first perform the same transformation,
but then feed it trough a non-linear activation function which skews the
9
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output to a more desirable codomain. We denote this entire transformation
as F(x) = y. In our case an intuitive codomain can be y ∈ [0, 1]n, where
n denotes the number of classes the dataset can be described with. Since
the final goal of classification is to obtain discrete descriptors of the input
data, we need to assign a label to the output. This is usually performed by
returning the index with the maximum value, C(x) = arg max
i
(yi).
The entire model can be written mathematically as
F(x) = y = softmax(θx+ b), (2.1)
where θ and b are the learnable parameters describing the model. In the
sense of an affine transformation, θ is a matrix of size n×m and provides a
linear transformation to the input vector, while b is a vector of size m which
provides an additional translation. Here, m denotes the dimensionality of our
input data x. Finally, we perform an additional non-linear transformation
with the softmax function
softmax(z) =
ez∑
i e
zi
, (2.2)
which performs the transformation into the desired codomain. Meaning our
final result y will have the property of 0 < yi < 1 and
∑
i yi = 1. This
property is useful since we can interpret the vector as a type of probability
prediction to a certain class. If the value of yi is high then we can also claim
that there is a high chance that the input should be described with the class
label i. We must note that logistic regression does not deal with probabilities
explicitly. While the properties of its predictions are modeled in this spirit,
the value yi has no solid connection to the actual probability that the input
observation is of class i.
2.2 Multilayer perceptron
A natural expansion of the logistic regression model is by adding more layers,
thus creating a basic form of an artificial neural network, the multilayer
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perceptron (MLP). Instead of having one layer denoted as F(x) in the logistic
regression, we stack multiple layers, where each layer contains the affine
transformation part following a non-linear function. The entire model can
be written as a composition
F = FL ◦ FL−1 ◦ · · · ◦ F1, (2.3)
where each layer F l is described by the affine transformation parameters θl,
bl, and a non-linearity σl,
F l(x) = σl(θlx+ bl). (2.4)
Common choices for σl are the sigmoid, tanh and the ReLU function, while
the last layer usually uses the softmax function or in the case of binary
classification the sigmoid:
sigmoid(z) =
1
1 + e−z
(2.5)
ReLU(z) = max(0, z). (2.6)
For the time being, the rectified linear unit (ReLU) is the most popular
activation function used in the hidden layers, since it has been shown that
neural networks using it behave in a very sparse manner and have smaller
problems with vanishing gradients.
While logistic regression can work well only on data that is linearly sep-
arable, an MLP with its non-linearities between the hidden layers can also
learn non-linearly separable problems. Even better, it has been shown that
feedforward fully connected neural networks are universal approximators [29].
Meaning that we can recreate any continuous function on a compact subset
of Rm with a neural network with one hidden layer of a finite size.
Since we are dealing with neural networks, we should explain that we
use the term neuron for each output element of a layer. In this sense, each
neurons action is to sum together, usually in a weighted manner, all its inputs
and perform some activation on the sum. Using our notation we say that F li
is the output of the i-th neuron in the layer l.
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For further purposes we also denote the affine transformation that occurs
before an activation function in a layer as Z l, meaning
F l = σl(Z l). (2.7)
We call this value the weighed input to the neurons in layer l. The weighted
input of the last layer ZL can also be called the logit value.
2.3 Convolutional neural networks
In the case of a multilayer perceptron, all the input features are processed
jointly. This way the network can find correlations between arbitrary features
in the first layer. In the case of images, it turns out that this is not very
helpful, because images contain data in a very regional type of way. Two
close pixels are much more likely to be of a similar color than a pair that
is further apart, so treating these pairs as equals can be detrimental to the
speed of learning and the final accuracy of our classifier.
A more suitable solution to image classifications are convolutional neu-
ral networks, pioneered by LeCun et. al. [30]. Their central idea is their
convolutional layer, where a kernel typically smaller than the input feature
map slides or “convolves” across it, performing element-wise multiplication
between its elements and those of the current region of the feature map, fol-
lowing by an additional summation to obtain a result for the current region
(visualization in Figure 2.1). Since images typically have multiple channels,
for example 3 channels for RGB values, the kernel can also have multiple
channels. By using convolution layers we are thus placing more weight to
features closer together on the image.
One important thing to note is that convolutional layers can be imple-
mented in the same way as fully connected layers, by matrix multiplication,
only that the matrices describing them are now sparse, since now we are
dealing with only a few pixel combinations at a time [31].
Besides convolutional layers, max pooling and dropout layers are also
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Figure 2.1: Kernel (shown in gray) sliding across the input feature (blue),
to produce the output feature (green). The kernel is of size 3× 3 and slides
across the input with strides of 1. An additional padding is used on the input
feature. Source [31].
used in convolutional neural networks, while the top layers are usually fully
connected.
A max pooling layer behaves similarly to a convolutional layer. It also
has a kernel that slides across the feature image, only that the kernel outputs
the maximal value in the region that it overlaps.
Dropout [32] is a regularization technique where a random selection of
neurons is dropped or turned to zero during training. The number of dropped
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Figure 2.2: A CNN architecture with two consecutive sets of a convolutional
layer and a pooling layer, followed by a fully connected layer. Here we show
our CNN2 architecture, described in Section 4.2.
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neurons is controlled by a fraction number p. When the neural network is
used for testing, all neurons are active but we decrease their strength by
1− p, to account for their greater number. This method causes the network
to learn less connections between neurons and serves as regularization.
A typical CNN architecture is shown in Figure 2.2.
2.4 Backpropagation and training
2.4.1 Backpropagation
We use the most popular way to train the parameters of our neural networks,
by gradient descent. We calculate the gradients using the backpropagation
algorithm. The core idea behind this process it that we set a some score that
describes how well our classifier is performing, we call this a cost function
and denote it as J . The goal of training the network is now to minimize
J with respect to the networks parameters θ and b. For this we need to
compute the gradients of J with respect to the parameters, after which we
perform a gradient descent where we perform updates to the parameters in
some form of
θ ← θ − α∇θJ (2.8)
b← b− α∇bJ, (2.9)
or similar. Here we used α as the learning rate parameter, which determines
the size of each step we take along the gradient descent.
The gradients are computed with the backpropagation algorithm. Its core
equations are the following,
δL = ∇FLJ  σL
′
(ZL) (2.10)
δl = ((θl+1)ᵀδl+1) σl′(Z l) (2.11)
∂J
∂blj
= δlj (2.12)
∂J
∂θljk
= F l−1k δ
l
j. (2.13)
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A quick description of the equations should be made. We strive to com-
pute the partial derivatives ∂J
∂blj
and ∂J
∂θljk
which describe the gradients in Equa-
tions (2.8) and (2.9). As an intermediate step we first compute the δl terms,
which describe the errors of neurons in the layer l, and afterwards we can
calculate the gradients. Note that the the output layer has the index L. As
the Equations (2.10) and (2.11) suggest, we calculate the error term using the
error term of the layer one level higher. So we first calculate the output layers
error δL and from there move backward trough the layers L− 1, L− 2, . . . , 1.
Hence the name backpropagation, since we can view this procedure as prop-
agating the errors backwards trough the network.
One additional thing to note, the sign  describes the Hadamard product
which is more simply put element-wise multiplication.
The complete procedure of computing the gradient is the following. First
we do a forward pass trough the network, while we also save computations of
all layer outputs and weighted inputs to the neurons F l and Z l. Afterwards
we compute the gradient of the cost function with respect to the outputs of
our classifier ∇FLJ and using the derivative of the output activation function
we obtain the error for the output layer δL. Lastly, we iteratively move
backwards trough the network and using Equation (2.11) compute the errors
for all other layers. Once we calculated the errors we can finally calculate
the gradients using Equations (2.12) and (2.13).
While Equation (2.11) seems to work only for fully-connected layers that
use this type of matrix θl+1, it can still be extended to convolutional layers,
since convolution can be rewritten as a fully-connected layer with a sparse
weight matrix.
Our primary goal is to create a classifier which correctly classifies as many
test examples as possible, so we use the categorical cross entropy as our
cost function, which is the same as the negative logarithm of the maximum
likelihood function [33],
J = − 1
N
∑
x
n∑
i=1
ŷi(x) log(FLi (x)), (2.14)
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where N is the number of images we classify, ŷ(x) is the one-hot encoded
true class value for instance x. Meaning that if the true class is k, then ŷk(x)
would have a value of one and all other elements of ŷ(x) would have a value
of zero.
2.4.2 Weight updating
As previously mentioned, training is performed in some form of weight up-
dates using gradient descent on the cost function. One of the simplest meth-
ods of training is stochastic gradient descent (SGD), where we calculate the
gradient using one training sample, or a batch of multiple samples. The
training is performed along multiple runs over the training data set, this
unit of time is also called an epoch.
One difficulty in this approach is that we are keeping the learning rate α
constant. Meaning that the steps we take don’t adapt much to the hyperplane
of the cost function. What is usually desired is to take longer steps in the
beginning of training, while shortening them when we approach the optimum.
This way we are less likely to miss the optimum, but we also need to be careful
not to decrease α too quickly since we can land in a worse local optimum.
In reality, hitting the global optimum is almost impossible in the case
of neural networks, but luckily recent studies have shown that local minima
have a similar value compared to the global minimum, so finding one of them
is good enough [34].
A simple solution to adapt the learning rate along the iterations is to
simply decrease α during training, we call this learning rate decay. α can
either be multiplied by some decay rate after each epoch or batch update, or
we can use the following equation
α← α
1 + decay ∗ iteration
,
where iteration can be batch number, epoch number or any other kind of
iteration scheme. For example we can perform the decay every couple epochs.
The decay value is usually in the range between 0.5 and 0.9.
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One other problem with SGD is that it performs poorly in areas where
the surface of the cost function curves much more steeply in one direction,
having a valley-like shape. In this case, gradient descent oscillates along the
slopes of the function, while only slowly moving towards the optimum [35].
We also compute the gradients on batches, where each batch can give a
slightly different average adding an additional noise to the gradient descent
path.
To fix these two problems we usually include some sort of moving aver-
aging or momentum, where we keep in mind previous values of the gradient
while computing the update. A popular gradient descent algorithm that
is based on the principle of momentum is Adam [36], which has been also
used in the research in this thesis. Instead of performing the update as in
Equations (2.8) and (2.9), we also keep track of the first and second moment
estimates, mt and vt,
gt ← ∇θJ(θt−1) (2.15)
mt ← β1mt−1 + (1− β1)gt (2.16)
vt ← β2vt−1 + (1− β2)g2t (2.17)
m̂t ←mt/(1− βt1) (2.18)
v̂t ← vt/(1− βt2) (2.19)
θt ← θt−1 − α
m̂t
(
√
v̂t + ε)
, (2.20)
where gt is the calculated gradient, while m̂t and v̂t are the bias corrected first
and second moments. Values β1 and β2 are exponential decay rates for the
moment estimates, while ε is just a constant added for numerical stability.
We omitted the update equations for biases for brevity, since the principle is
the same.
Authors report of several advantages of Adam, such as step sizes approxi-
mately bounded by the learning rate, good performance on sparse gradients,
and invariant magnitudes of the updates to rescaling gradients.
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2.5 Radial basis function networks
Goodfellow et. al. [4] state that radial basis function networks (RBFN) should
be a natural choice of classifiers that are more robust against adversarial
examples. This is why we chose to use them also.
This type of an artificial neural network uses a linear combination of
radial basis functions to compute the predictions. More specifically we feed
the input image into a series of radial basis functions φi and feed their outputs
into a logistical regression model. In mathematical terms we are dealing with
F(x) = softmax(θφ(x) + b). (2.21)
Similarly to the case of logistic regression Equation (2.1), θ is a weight
matrix, but here it has a size of n× t, where t is the number of radial basis
functions. In our case we will only use the Gaussian kernel
φi(x) = exp(−βi‖x− ci‖22). (2.22)
Each function differs from the other only in the choice of its center vector ci
and scaling parameter βi. The idea behind RBFNs is that we are comparing
how similar the input x is to the selected centers ci. For example, if an input
vector more closely resembles a center of class i then we can more easily say
that it actually belongs to this class.
We can select the centroids by randomly sampling them from the training
set, or we can use a clustering algorithm such as K-means to compute them,
in this case we can find a good value of βi, by calculating the variance of the
cluster σi and setting βi = 1/σ
2
i .
Since we are dealing with a multi-dimensional space where the features
of the datasets do not have unit variance, a safer choice of the distance in
Equation (2.22) would be the Mahalanobis distance
DM(x) =
√
(x− c)ᵀΣ−1(x− c), (2.23)
instead of the Euclidean measure, since we also take into account the variance
and covariance in the features by using the covariance matrix Σ. There can
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be a problem if we have features with zero variance. In this case Σ would be
singular and DM impossible to compute. We can use the pseudo inverse Σ
+
to overcome this problem, for example the Moore-Penrose inverse.
In the case of large feature spaces, the inverse of the covariance matrix can
be too large to store in the memory. For example, images from the MNIST
dataset that we will use are of size 28 × 28, and we used 100 centers. This
gives us 100 covariance matrices of size 784×784, taking a total of 245Mb of
memory. We also had some problems with broadcasting working as it should,
so if we had a batch size of 32, it meant that we had to copy the matrices 32
times, taking up 7.84 Gb of space, which was unhandleable.
In this case a simplification had to be made by only using the variances
of each feature. The Equation (2.22) translates to
φi(x) = exp(−βᵀi (x− ci)), (2.24)
where βi is now a vector with n elements, each describing the variance of
its belonging feature or pixel. Note that the index i indicates the cluster on
which we obtained the center and its variances.
While the RBFN with this type of kernel looses some ability to model
the distribution of the training set by omitting the covariance, we still aren’t
assuming unit variance, which is highly unlikely in our datasets, and conse-
quentially having a stronger model than if only using a standard Euclidean
distance with Equation (2.22).
Using only variances we can also have problems with singular values if
we simply assign βij = 1/σ
2
ij. As we used the generalized inverse in the
case of the covariance matrix, we can use the properties of calculating the
Moore-Penrose inverse for a diagonal matrix to calculate β. We obtain
βij =
0 σij = 01/σ2ij otherwise . (2.25)
Using this formulation we simply ignore features with zero variance. But,
doing so we face a new problem. Since we have different clusters, some
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might have a different number of features with zero variance. We found that
this causes the model to be unable to learn. We handled this problem by
normalizing the distance βᵀi (x−ci) by normalizing it with the L0 measure of
the βi vector, or with the number of features with non-zero variance, giving
us the final kernel equation
φi(x) = exp
(
−β
ᵀ
i (x− ci)
L0(βi)
)
. (2.26)
As noted before, we select the centers and its scaling parameters using
K-means. The following fully-connected layer is trained as a normal neural
network. But we can have two distinctions. We can freeze the RBF layer
and only train the fully-connected one, or we can initialize the radial basis
functions as before, but also train it on the training data in parallel with the
fully-connected layer, with the help of backpropagation. Schwenker et. al.
[37] describe our first method as two-phase learning. They also coin a three-
phase learning scheme, where after their two-phase learning, they perform
a final learning phase where the RBF and fully-connected layers are trained
simultaneously. Since, with our second method, we train the fully-connected
layer only once, we call our method as 2.5-phase learning.
Chapter 3
Adversarial examples
3.1 Introduction to adversarial examples
3.1.1 Definition
As mentioned in Section 1.2, Szegedy et. al. [3] first discovered the existence
of adversarial examples. They describe the search for adversarial examples
as an optimization problem with a box-constraint
Minimize ‖η‖2
subject to C(x+ η) = l where l 6= C∗(x)
x+ η ∈ [0, 1]n.
(3.1)
Meaning we would like to add as little perturbation η as possible, while
fooling the classifier C by returning the incorrect class label C∗(x) 6= l and
keeping in mind the pixel value constraint where each pixel value is in the
rage between 0 and 1. The Equation (3.1) is usually a standard definition of
the adversarial examples search. This problem can be very difficult to solve,
since the classification function C is discrete. To circumvent this problem,
the authors designed an approximation minimization problem to (3.1)
Minimize c‖η‖22 + J(x+ η, l)
subject to x+ η ∈ [0, 1]n.
(3.2)
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Meaning we minimize the sum of the perturbation norm and the cost
function, where we supply it an incorrect class label l. The parameter c is a
weight that determines how much we would like to minimize the perturbation
versus the cost function. The penalty function is now smooth and much
more manageable. Since cost functions of neural networks are non-convex in
general, only an approximation of this problem can be found. The authors
solved this problem by performing a line-search to find the minimum c > 0
for which the box-constrained L-BFGS [38] minimizer satisfies C(x+ η) = l.
Although the authors report very good performance from this attack
method, where the attacks were always successful and the perturbations were
small, it has a drawback in that it is very computationally intensive.
We will use the methods FGSM [4], BIM [5], and DeepFool [6], instead of
the L-BFGS attack, which are simpler heuristic solutions to Equation (3.1),
but run faster and in some cases perform equally to L-BFGS. These attacks
are described in the Sections 3.2 to 3.4.
3.1.2 Types of attacks
We can split the creation of adversarial examples into different types of at-
tacks, according to what target class we would like to obtain when classifying
the perturbed images. The simplest division of the types is into “untargeted”
and “targeted” mode.
When performing the “untargeted” mode, our only constraint for the
target class is that it is different from the original. So l in Equation (3.1)
must only satisfy the l 6= C∗(x) constraint. This mode can lead to less
interesting misclassifications, such as classifying the digit 7 as a 1 in the
MNIST dataset, or a cat instead of a dog in the CIFAR10 dataset. This is
because the most likely misclassification will be one of the top few predictions
for the original image, excluding the best one. If the classifier is trained well
these top predictions must be semantically close, explaining the uninteresting
misclassifications.
The “targeted” mode, first introduced by Kurakin et. al. [5], can help in
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this case. Here we are picking by hand the target class of the image, so the
constraint C(x) = l in Equation (3.1) is less relaxed. Since we can target any
class, we can obtain much more drastic misclassifications, like classifying an
image of a horse as a ship.
Kurakin et. al. also introduced a further constraint to the targeted mode,
they choose the least-likely class among the predictions for the original image
x
l̃LL = arg min
l
(F l(x)) (3.3)
We call this method as the “targeted least-likely” mode. In this case we are
trying to target the semantically most different class from the truth.
3.1.3 Source of adversarial examples
An easy way to hypothesize why adversarial examples exist is because of high
non-linearities in a neural network. This has also been assumed by Szegedy
et. al. [3], stating that adversarial examples are low-probability and high-
dimensional pockets, which are hard to find. This was shown by Goodfellow
et .al. [4] to be likely false, while instead a much more likely origin are actually
the linearities in classifiers. They show this using a simple example of a dot
product between a weight vector and an adversarial example. Something
that is present in basic logistic models, in fully connected activation layers
of MLPs or even in convolutional layers, since convolution can be expressed
as a linear operation.
We can write the adversarial example as x̃ = x+η, where x̃ is the adver-
sarial example, x the original unperturbed image and η is the perturbation.
Performing a dot product of x̃ with the weight vector θ instead of the original
image gives us
θᵀx̃ = θᵀx+ θᵀη, (3.4)
causing the activation to grow by θᵀη. This increase can be maximized if we
also consider the max norm constrain on η, if we assign it as η = sign(θ),
which means the activation grows by the L1 norm of the weight vector. If
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we define the average magnitude of an element of the weight vector by n and
consider that the weight vector or the input images have dimension of m, we
can rewrite the increase as mn.
This example can be quite shocking, as it shows that by trying to align
with the weight vectors, we can make small bit-sized increments to the pixels
and still cause a large change in the activation. A further problem arises from
the fact that this change to the activation grows linearly with the dimension of
the input images. So larger images can have smaller pixel-wise perturbations
that can cause harm but can be harder to detect, than on images of smaller
dimensions.
This explanation is simpler than the ones proposed previously [3] and
also explains how even a simple linear model can have adversarial examples,
if its input is of a sufficient dimension.
It also hints that the curse of dimensionality might be an important factor
to take into account when explaining why adversarial examples exist.
3.2 Fast Gradient Sign Method
Following their results described in Section 3.1.3, Goodfellow et. al. [4] were
able to formulate a fast method of constructing adversarial examples.
If we have a logistic model as our classifier, we can easily obtain the
perturbation. As shown before, we must only obtain the sign representation
of the parameter vector and optionally scale it with a hyperparameter ε,
obtaining η = ε sign(w). We run into a problem when trying to attack other
types of classifiers. For example neural networks with one or more hidden
layers where this simple solution does not stand. Goodfellow et. al. solve
this with a linearization of the models cost function J(θ,x, y) around the
input image and using that as the weight vector. Thus the perturbation is
calculated as
η = ε sign(∇xJ(θ,x, y)). (3.5)
Applying this gradient to the logistic model trained with a cross-entropy
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loss function it gives us exactly the weight vector θ. The authors call this
method “fast gradient sign method” or FGSM, since it is easy to compute by
using a variation of the backpropagation algorithm to compute the gradient.
The difference here is that we are backpropagating the gradients with respect
to the pixel values in the image, but the principle is similar.
Since all pixels are perturbed by the same magnitude, this method is
maximizing the cost subject to the L∞ constraint.
We also have to take into account the range of the pixel values, so clipping
to desired pixel values is performed while creating the adversary, for example
to the range [0, 255].
We feed the cost function with the original image class. This means that
we are performing an “untargeted attack”, since we are only trying to make
the model misclassify the adversary without aiming for a specified resulting
class. FGSM can be further expanded to the “targeted” mode. All we do
is calculate the gradient of the loss function, where we use the target class
ỹ 6= y and move in the opposite direction of the sign of the gradient
η = −ε sign(∇xJ(θ,x, ỹ)). (3.6)
In this case we are trying to improve the loss value while targeting the wrong
class instead of increasing it for the right. Of course, we can extend the
targeted mode by aiming for the least-likely class (Equation (3.3)).
The method is described fully in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 The FGSM algorithm for a multiclass general classifier
input: Image x, target class label y, classifier C, classifiers cost function J , perturbation
size parameter eps (ε), targeted mode boolean targeted
output: Perturbation η̂
1: if targeted then
2: return η̂ = −eps× sign(∇xJ(θ,x, y))
3: else
4: return η̂ = eps× sign(∇xJ(θ,x, y))
5: end if
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3.3 Basic Iterative Method
The Fast Gradient Sign method can be easily modified to perform iteratively
and dramatically increase its performance. Kurakin et. al. [5] first introduced
this iterative version of FGSM called basic iterative method or BIM for short.
They perform FGSM multiple times by moving in smaller steps ε′ while
additionally performing clipping to a global L∞ distance of ε from the original
image:
x0 = x, x
adv
n+1 = Clipx,ε
{
xadvn + ε
′ sign(∇xJ(θ,xadvn , y))
}
. (3.7)
Of course clipping into the valid pixel range values is also necessary.
As before, BIM can also be implemented in a targeted fashion. We modify
the equation (3.7) to
x0 = x, x
adv
n+1 = Clipx,ε
{
xadvn − ε′ sign(∇xJ(θ,xadvn , ỹ))
}
(3.8)
Kurakin et. al. extend their method into the “targeted least-likely” mode
and name it as the “iterative least-likely class method” [5].
In Algorithm 2 we show the procedure of the basic iterative method.
Algorithm 2 The BIM algorithm for a multiclass general classifier
input: Image x, target class label y, classifier C, classifiers cost function J , parameter
eps (ε), iteration step eps iter, number of iterations nb iter, targeted mode boolean
targeted
output: Perturbation η̂
1: Initialize x0 ← x, i← 0
2: for i = 0 to nb iter− 1 do
3: if targeted then
4: ηi ← −eps iter× sign(∇xJ(θ,xi, y))
5: else
6: ηi ← eps iter× sign(∇xJ(θ,xi, y))
7: end if
8: xi+1 ← Clipx0,eps {xi + ηi}
9: end for
10: return η̂ = xnb iter − x0
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3.4 DeepFool Method
Moosavi-Dezfooli et. al. [6] set out to design a method that describes the
robustness of classifying models. Fist they define the robustness of classifier
C at point x (∆(x; C)) as the minimal perturbation η∗ that is sufficient to
change the estimated class C(x)
∆(x; C) ≡ min
η
‖η‖2 subject to C(x+ η) 6= C(x). (3.9)
From there they define the robustness of a classifier as
ρadv(C) = Ex
∆(x; C)
‖x‖2
, (3.10)
where Ex is the expectation over the distribution of the data. The authors
don’t mention why the division with the L2 value of the image is done. We
believe it performs a correction for the relative intensity of the image. If the
image is brighter, then the perturbation should also be stronger for it to be
apparent. The normalization tries to correct this.
From the definition, it follows that a classifier with a larger robustness
value can only be fooled by larger perturbations, while a classifier with a
small robustness can also be fooled by smaller perturbations.
While this definition of robustness will help us further on, it has its draw-
back of needing an optimal method of finding the smallest perturbations to
create adversarial examples, which is hard to create. The authors of Deep-
Fool try to tackle this but, while obtaining very small perturbations, admit
that their new method is not optimal.
To find an adversarial example, Moosavi-Dezfooli et. al. look for the clos-
est decision boundary that is different from the current prediction C(x) and
step over it. This is an easy operation if we are dealing with an affine mul-
ticlass classifier of the form Z(x) = θx + b, since its decision boundary
hyperplanes form a polyhedron. For a general classifier such as a neural net-
work on the other hand, we are dealing with non-linear hyperplanes with no
such favorable property. The authors work around this problem by lineariz-
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ing the classifiers decision space and iteratively moving across it until the
true boundary is found (Algorithm 3).
Algorithm 3 The DeepFool algorithm for a multiclass general classifier
input: Image x, classifier C, output of the classifier’s final layer F , maximum number of
iterations max iter, parameter overshoot
output: Perturbation η̂
1: Initialize x0 ← x, i← 0
2: while C(xi) = C(x0) and i < max iter do
3: for l 6= C(x0) do
4: w′k ← ∇xFk(xi)−∇xFC(x0)(xi)
5: F ′k ← Fk(xi)− FC(x0)(xi)
6: end for
7: l̂← arg minl 6=C(x0)
|F ′k|
‖w′k‖2
8: ηi ←
|F ′
l̂
|
‖w′
l̂
‖2w
′
l̂
9: xi+1 ← xi + ηi
10: i← i+ 1
11: end while
12: return η̂ = (1 + overshoot)
∑
i ηi
The algorithm adds a maximum number of iterations max iter to avoid
any infinite loops. It also includes an overshoot parameter. This serves as
a security measure to jump over the decision boundary if we land directly on
it.
The procedure is strongly tied to existing optimization techniques for find-
ing roots of a non-linear system of equations, similarly to Newton’s method.
We have some skepticism about the optimality of this method. Since
the authors state that it behaves similarly to Newton’s method, we think it
should be inspected if it is really a good idea to abruptly stop the iterations
immediately after the boundary has been reached, since further iterations
around it might reduce the perturbations size even further.
The Algorithm 3 proposed by Moosavi-Dezfooli et. al. is an “untargeted”
method that searches for the class that needs the smallest perturbation. It
could also be altered to perform in a targeted manner, but we chose not to
change the existing code.
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3.5 Defense by adversarial training
An intuitive method of defense was already proposed by Szegedy et. al. in
the first paper discovering adversarial examples [3]. They adversarially per-
turbed the train images and included them back into the train set, hoping
that the classifier gets further fine-tuned on the perturbations, increasing its
robustness against them. Goodfellow et. al. named this procedure “adversar-
ial training”. This method is close in spirit to hard-negative mining, where
we identify training set examples on which our classifier performs poorly.
The training set distribution is updated during the iterations to focus more
on those.
The L-BFGS method of Szegedy et. al. method was too slow at con-
structing adversarial examples to obtain any significant results, but they still
reported on some success with greater resistance against adversarial exam-
ples, and a slightly improved generalization.
Goodfellow et. al.[4] could test this method of defense in depth, since
their method of attack constructed adversaries much faster. FGSM also is
not iterative so they didn’t have to feed adversarial images back into the
training set, but could include the computation of adversaries directly into
the classifiers cost function used for training. The modified cost function was
J̃(θ,x, y) = αJ (θ,x, y) + (1− α)J (θ,x+ ε sign(∇xJ(θ,x, y)), y) , (3.11)
where α is a parameter describing the ratio of contribution to the training
between clean images and adversarial examples.
While the Equation (3.11) is an interesting way of training, we will not
use it. It doesn’t help us with the iterative methods BIM and DeepFool,
where we must use the normal training set replacement method. This will
also be used in the case of FGSM, since we want to be fair while compar-
ing the attack methods. The updated cost function always uses the current
trained classifier, meaning that even each batch, the method returns differ-
ent adversarial examples. This should make the training method using the
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modified cost function faster and giving us another reason to declare it un-
fair towards BIM and DeepFool. Furthermore, FGSM computes adversaries
so quickly, that the extra time we would get by using the new cost function
would be negligible compared to the time we must spend computing the train
set adversarial examples with BIM or DeepFool.
Chapter 4
Experimental setup
We compare three different attack methods, FGSM, BIM, and DeepFool. We
also use three modes of attack when using FGSM and BIM. This includes
the untargeted mode without supplying the attack with true class labels,
untargeted mode with supplied true class labels, and the targeted mode tar-
geting the least-likely class. The evaluations have been run on two datasets,
where we used different types of classification models. These ranged from
a simple logistic regression, convolutional networks to radial basis function
networks that were used in hopes of their better robustness against adversar-
ial examples. Furthermore, we introduce a novel technique of evaluating the
robustness of a classifier, which helps us compare to the different methods of
attack.
4.1 Benchmark datasets
Our experiments have been performed on the MNIST [10] and CIFAR10 [11]
datasets. In Figure 4.1 we show 100 example images of each dataset.
MNIST is a collection of labeled images of handwritten digits. It includes
10 digit classes from 0 to 9. Each image is of size 28× 28, is only black and
white, and always shows the digit centered and of uniform size. The dataset
consists of 60,000 training set examples and 10,000 test set examples. For the
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sake of training we also split the training set into 50,000 training examples
and 10,000 examples that were used for validation.
The CIFAR10 dataset is a collection of 32 × 32 labeled images of the
following objects:
0: airplane
1: automobile
2: bird
3: cat
4: deer
5: dog
6: frog
7: horse
8: ship
9: truck
These images are colored, so the data has three RGB channels of size
32 × 32. Here, the objects are not always centered and they can differ in
their size on the image. This dataset is much more complex than MNIST.
Not only because of the three color values and the larger images, but also
because of a much more varied distribution of objects it describes. The classes
are wildly different one to another, this is also true for their subjects, since
0
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3
4
5
6
7
8
9
(b) CIFAR10
Figure 4.1: Example images of the MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. Each
row shows examples from the same class. The numbering for MNIST images
are self descriptive, while for CIFAR10 they are the same as the numbering
of the class labels, described above.
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the objects can be pictured under various angles, in various scenes. Also, the
objects can be of different types. For example, a ship can be a yacht or a
sailboat and a dog can be a chihuahua or a golden retriever.
This dataset contains 50,000 training images, from which we took 5,000
for the validations set, and 10,000 test images.
We chose not to use datasets with larger images, like ImageNet [39],
because our evaluation based on running many combinations of attacking
method and classifying models with a substantial number of attack parame-
ters.
4.2 Classifiers
We implemented the architectures of the different classifiers in such a way
so that their success or generalization ability varied as much as possible,
without intentionally weakening them, for example, by training them for not
enough epochs. With that in mind we used one logistic regression classifier,
one multi-layered perceptron (MLP), a few convolutional neural networks of
different sizes, and classifiers of the radial basis function network type.
The models used for classification of the MNIST and CIFAR10 images
had the same architecture, but we sometimes adapted the size of a layer to
increase the capability of a model on the CIFAR10 dataset. The architectures
are shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
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LR
Dense(10)
Softmax
MLP
Dense(64/512)
ReLU
Dense(64/128)
ReLU
Dense(10)
Softmax
CNN1
Conv(32× 3× 3)
ReLU
MaxPool(2× 2)
Dense(128)
ReLU
Dense(10)
Softmax
CNN2
Conv(32× 3× 3)
ReLU
Conv(64× 3× 3)
ReLU
MaxPool(2× 2)
Dropout(0.25)
Dense(128)
ReLU
Dropout(0.5)
Dense(10)
Softmax
CNN3
Conv(32× 3× 3)
ReLU
Conv(64× 3× 3)
ReLU
MaxPool(2× 2)
Conv(64× 3× 3)
ReLU
MaxPool(2× 2)
Dropout(0.25)
Dense(128/256)
ReLU
Dropout(0.5)
Dense(10)
Softmax
CNN4
Conv(32/64× 3× 3)
ReLU
Conv(32/64× 3× 3)
ReLU
MaxPool(2× 2)
Conv(64/128× 3× 3)
ReLU
Conv(64/128× 3× 3)
ReLU
MaxPool(2× 2)
Dense(200/256)
ReLU
Dropout(0.5)
Dense(200/256)
ReLU
Dense(10)
Softmax
Table 4.1: Architectures of the neural network type models used for classify-
ing MNIST and CIFAR10 images. Here Dense(N) denotes a fully connected
layer of N neurons (biases are always included), Conv(k × h × w) is a con-
volutional layer with k filters of size h × w, and similarly MaxPool(h × w)
describes a max-pooling layer of size h × w. We always used strides of size
1 in the convolutional and pooling layers. If the classifier differs in layer size
for MNIST or CIFAR10, we denote this change with the slash sign in the
form of XMNIST/XCIFAR10.
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RBFN1
RBF(100)
Dense(10)
Softmax
RBFN2
RBF(100)
Dense(50)
ReLU
Dense(10)
Softmax
RBFN3
RBF(100)
Dense(80)
ReLU
Dense(40)
ReLU
Dense(10)
Softmax
Table 4.2: Architectures of the RBFN type models used for classifying
MNIST and CIFAR10 images. Along with layer abbreviations from Table 4.1
we also add RBF(N), which describes the radial basis layer with N centers
and uses the Euclidean distance measure, Equation (2.22).
4.2.1 Experiments on MNIST
In the experiments performed on the MNIST dataset, we used the models
described in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. Additionally, we added some variations to
the RBFN classifiers. Here we list all classifiers used and state the additional
RBFN models with their description.
• LR: logistic regression
• MLP: Two fully connected hidden layers
• CNN1: One convolutional layer and one fully connected layer
• CNN2: Two convolutional layers and one fully connected layer
• CNN3: Three convolutional layers and one fully connected layer
• CNN4: Four convolutional layers and two fully connected layers
• RBFN1: A classic radial basis function network
• RBFN2: RBFN with one fully connected hidden layer
• RBFN3: RBFN with two fully connected hidden layers
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• RFBN1var: Similar architecture to RBFN1, only that its RBF layer uses
the pixel-wise variances and the L0 normalization in the distance mea-
sure (Equation (2.26)).
• RBFN1lr: Architecture of RBFN1, but trained with the 2.5-phase learn-
ing method. Meaning we don’t fix the RBF layer during training, so
its centers obtained with K-means get updated by backporpagation.
• RBFN2lr: Architecture of RBFN2. Again we use the 2.5-phase training
method.
The RBFN classifiers always used an RBF layer with 100 centers. These
were obtained by using K-means to obtain 10 centers for each of the 10
subsets of the training set, where each subset belonged to its digit class.
CNN4 used the Nesterov gradient descent optimizer with a learning rate of
0.1 and momentum od 0.9. All other classifiers were trained with the Adam
optimizer. In Table 4.3 we show the learning rates of these classifiers trained
with Adam.
learning rate MNIST models using this learning rate
0.0001 CNN1
0.001 LR, MLP, CNN2, CNN3, RBFN3, RBFN1lr, RBFN2lr
0.01 RBFN1, RBFN2, RBFN1var
Table 4.3: Groups of classifiers with the same learning rate. These MNIST
classifiers have been trained with the Adam optimization method.
Each classifier was trained until their loss value on the validation set
didn’t start to rise, indicating that the model is overfitting. We show an
example of the accuracy and loss values on the validation and test set during
each epoch of training the CNN2 classifier in Figure 4.2. There we see that
while validation loss started to rise at epoch 17, the train set loss continued
to drop, indicating overfitting.
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Figure 4.2: Visualization of the loss values during the epochs of training
the CNN2 classifier. The black line denotes the epoch where the model was
finished training since its validation loss reached the lowest value.
4.2.2 Experiments on CIFAR10
Again, most of the CIFAR10 classifiers are described in Tables 4.1 and 4.2,
but we added more variations to the RBFN classifiers and to CNN4. All models
are listed here with the included descriptions to the additional RBFN models
• LR: logistic regression
• MLP: Two fully connected hidden layers
• CNN1: One convolutional layer and one fully connected layer
• CNN2: Two convolutional layers and one fully connected layer
• CNN3: Three convolutional layers and one fully connected layer
• CNN4: Four convolutional layers and two fully connected layers
• RBFN1: A classic radial basis function network
• CNN4dec: The same architecture as in CNN4. Here we implement a
delayed decay to the learning rate. We half the learning rate, initially
0.01, every 10 epochs.
• RBFN1var: Identical to the MNIST classifier of the same name. RNFB1
where the RBF layer uses pixel-wise variance.
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• RBFN2varlr: Same architecture as RBFN2, its RBF layer uses pixel-wise
variance, and we train the model using the 2.5-phase method.
• RBFN1varlr: Same architecture as RBFN1, only we train it with the
2.5-phase method, and the RBF layer uses pixel-wise variance.
Again we initialized the RBF layers with K-means by selecting 10 centers
for each class, obtaining 100 in total.
The two CNN4 models were trained with the Nesterov gradient descent
optimizer, with a learning rate of 0.1 and momentum of 0.9. As in the
case of the MNIST models, the other classifiers were trained with the Adam
optimizer. We show the difference in the learning rates used for these models
in Table 4.4.
learning rate CIFAR10 models using this learning rate
0.0001 LR
0.0005 CNN1
0.001 MLP, CNN2, CNN3, RBFN1varlr
0.01 RBFN1, RBFN1var, RBFN2varlr
Table 4.4: Groups of classifiers with the same learning rate. These CIFAR10
classifiers have been trained with the Adam optimization method.
Again, we trained the models until their loss stopped decreasing, as de-
scribed in Section 4.2.1.
4.3 Evaluation metrics
We mostly focus on classification accuracy to compare the classifiers and
their attacks. This is obtained by calculating the fraction of images, be it
clean or adversarially perturbed, that have been correctly classified. Also, we
had problems comparing CIFAR10 classifiers, since they had wildly different
classification accuracies on clean images. In these cases we usually show the
accuracy computed on the subset of clean images that the classifier initially
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classified correctly. This gives us a relative change in classification accuracy
when attacking the model and makes the comparison between classifiers eas-
ier.
4.3.1 Accuracy-perturbation graphs
The attacks described in Sections 3.2 to 3.4 have very different hyper-
parameters, making the attacks hard to compare. We could pick the best
hyper-parameters of each attack method and compare their results, but pick-
ing the best hyper-parameters is a subjective decision. In the simplest case
of the fast gradient method where we have only one parameter ε, that de-
termines the size of the perturbation. A good attack wants to have as low
as possible perturbations while increasing the classifiers error rate as much
as possible. Here we of course must do a trade-off between the two since
decreasing ε reduces the perturbations while decreasing the successfulness of
the attacks, while increasing the value does the opposite. We get even more
problems when we move to attacks such as DeepFool and BIM, where we
deal with multiple parameters which deal in a similar fashion, but also bring
a new problem. Since they are iterative methods we also can’t have a large
number of iterations, since the attacks would take too much time to finish.
We devise a novel method of comparing the attacks. Instead of searching
the optimal hyper-parameters, we construct an “efficiency plot” for each
attack. This is done by attacking the classifier with different combinations
of hyper-parameters. For each combination we obtain an average value of
successful adversarial perturbations and the accuracy of the model on the
adversarial examples. We then plot these pairs as points on a “accuracy-
perturbation” graph, giving us a characteristic curve that describes how the
attack method is successful (or not) under a certain perturbation size. These
curves are only dependant on the choice of the attack method and on the
classification model, so we can compare the different attacks much more
elegantly.
Instead of just looking at the size of the perturbation, we use the ro-
40 CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
bustness measure (Equation (3.10)) of Moosavi-Dezfooli et. al. [6], since its
normalization is a good idea. The value ρadv(C) cannot describe the clas-
sifiers robustness, since we are not stating that any of the attack methods
are optimal. We pick the name “image-perturbation” since we are using
ρadv(C) only as a quantity describing how much the image is changed. The
image-perturbation value is calculated as
ρ̂adv(C) =
1
|D|
∑
x∈D
‖η‖2
‖x‖2
, (4.1)
where D represents the test set of images we are perturbing.
In Figure 4.3 we show a few examples of the accuracy-perturbation curves,
to show how to compare the curves between each other. The more robust
a classifier is, the more should its curve lie to the right of the plot. An
optimal classifier should have the accuracy at 100% for most of the image-
perturbation values. There should be a point where the curve starts to
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(b) Scattered points
Figure 4.3: Examples of accuracy-perturbation plots. Figure 4.3a shows
curves of classifiers A and B, where the attack method produces simple or-
dered points. Figure 4.3b shows curves of classifiers C and D, where the at-
tack method produces scattered points to wich we add the top wrap, shown
in dashed line and a minimum worst-case wrap shown in solid line.
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fall, but this fall should only be attributed to the loss of information in
an image because of excessive damage done to it, not from small changes.
In examples A and B in Figure 4.3a, we see that A performs worse than
B, since its accuracy starts to fall at lower perturbation values and since its
curve actually reaches zero classification accuracy. The same can be observed
in Figure 4.3b. Classifier D performs slightly better than C, since its curve
lies slightly to the right of the curve C.
Note that in Figure 4.3b we compared a bottom wrap of the curves.
If the perturbation/accuracy pairs obtained from the different parameter
combinations of the method can be ordered so that we obtain a simple curve,
then we can just link the points and obtain a rough representation of the
accuracy-perturbation curve, as shown in Figure 4.3a. This is true for the
case of the FGSM attacks, since FGSM has only one parameter eps that
we can change. Looking at the equation Equation (3.5), we notice, that the
magnitude of the perturbations rises linearly with eps, so the points in the
accuracy-perturbation curve can be ordered.
We run into a problem when dealing with methods that use multiple
parameters, like BIM or DeepFool. In this case we usually obtain scattered
perturbation/accuracy points, as shown in Figure 4.3b. Scattered accuracy-
perturbation points are much harder to compare, so we devised a method of
making a minimum and maximum wrap of the points. The minimum wrap
is especially important and will be the main method of comparison, since it
gives us a worst case estimate of the models classification accuracy on the
adversarial examples of a certain image-perturbation value.
The first thought we had, was to use a standard gift-wrapping algorithm,
like the Jarvis march [40]. Unfortunately these types of algorithms return a
convex wrap of the points, which wouldn’t be very usefully to us, as we are
dealing with non-convex clusters of points.
We present the wrapping method in Algorithm 4. The algorithm first
finds the two lowest points of the data and adds them to the final array.
Then it iterates trough the other points according to their ascending Acc
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Algorithm 4 The wrap algorithm for scattered accuracy-perturbation points
input: image-perturbation values ρ, classification accuracy values Acc
output: indexes of the wrapping points idxs
1: Acc sorted idxs ← sort indexes of the points according to ascending values of Acc
// Initialize the array of the wrapping indexes with the lowest two points of the data
2: idxs ← Acc sorted idxs[:2] // These must be sorted according to their ρ value
3: for all i in Acc sorted idxs[2:] do
4: if ρ[i] < ρ[idxs[0]] then
5: idxs.prepend(i)
6: end if
7: if ρ[i] > ρ[idxs[−1]] then
8: idxs.append(i)
9: end if
10: end for
11: return idxs
values. If the current point in the loop is to the left of the left-most point
in the wrap array, then we put it on the beginning of the array and if it is
to the right of the right-most point in the wrap array, then we put it on the
end. This way we obtain a heuristic bottom wrap of the points. Note, that
this method is not perfect, but it suffices for our needs.
To obtain the top wrap of the points we use the same algorithm, but feed
it the opposite values of Acc, where we multiply Acc with −1. This inverts
our points, meaning that the minimum wrap of the inverted points is the
same as the maximum wrap of the original points.
4.4 Implementation
We implemented our experiments using the cleverhans [41] library on top
of Tensorflow [42] and Keras [43]. cleverhans is a library designed for con-
struction of adversarial examples and contained all of the described methods
of attack, it sits on top of the tensorflow library used for machine learning
models, mainly for neural network computations. Keras is an abstraction on
top of tensorflow which allows us easier handling of neural networks.
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The tests were run on an Intel Xeon E5-1650 CPU with an Nvidia GeForce
GTX 980 graphics card.
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Chapter 5
Experimental results
5.1 Baseline results
First we show the baseline results of the classifiers defined in Section 4.2 on
the clean MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets, so that we can compare them to
results on adversarially perturbed images.
We show the test set accuracy of the MNIST models in Table 5.1. Nat-
urally, the CNNs performed better than logistic regression and the MLP,
since they are better suited for image classification. Overall, CNN3 achieved
the highest classification accuracy, closely followed by CNN4. As expected,
the RBFN also performed worse than the CNNs. While using pixel-wise
variances decreased the models accuracy, adding hidden layers and using the
Test set Test set
Model accuracy Model accuracy
LR 92.69% RBFN1 94.67%
MLP 97.53% RBFN2 96.86%
CNN1 98.67% RBFN3 96.84%
CNN2 99.21% RBFN1var 92.33%
CNN3 99.44% RBFN2lr 97.77%
CNN4 99.24% RBFN1lr 96.55%
Table 5.1: Test set classification accuracy of our MNIST models.
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2.5-phase learning increased it.
The final test set accuracy of the CIFAR10 models is shown in Table 5.2.
Because the images in CIFAR10 are much more varied, our models perform
much worse than those of the MNIST set, achieving maximally 76% accu-
racy. Naturally the CNN models performed the best, following by the MLP
and RBFN classifiers. Logistic regression performed the worst. This was
expected, since it is also the simplest.
We could achieve even better results with a more complex neural net-
work, but this wasn’t very important to our research, as we were mainly
interested in the relative change in the classifiers accuracy, when presented
with adversarial examples.
Test set Test set
Model accuracy Model accuracy
LR 40.97% RBFN1 41.43%
MLP 52.41% RBFN1var 44.25%
CNN1 65.86% RBFN1varlr 51.62%
CNN2 70.47% RBFN2varlr 53.70%
CNN3 76.65%
CNN4 76.17%
CNN4dec 76.25%
Table 5.2: Classification accuracy on the CIFAR10 test set for our classifi-
cation models.
5.2 Resistance of classifiers
First we inspected how the different models handled adversarial examples
made with FGSM, BIM, and DeepFool, where the model classifying the ex-
amples was also used to create them. For each of the three attack methods
we compare the classifiers by comparing their accuracy-perturbation curves.
Since we had many classifiers to compare, we split them into two groups,
compared the groups separately and then cross-compared the most impor-
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tant classifiers from the two groups. We selected the RBFN type classifiers as
one group and the remaining classifiers, which we called the neural network
type classifiers, as the other.
To get a better grasp on the image-perturbation values of the accuracy-
perturbation plots, we visualize adversarial examples in Figure 5.1 for the
MNIST dataset and in Figure 5.2 for CIFAR10. In each visualization we se-
lected three images and perturbed them with FGSM, BIM and the DeepFool
method in such a way that we obtained 5 adversarial examples, each with a
different image-perturbation size. For MNIST we show adversarial examples
with image-perturbations in ranges
[0.1, 0.2] [0.2, 0.4] [0.4, 0.6] [0.6, 1] [1, 1.5],
while we use the following ranges for CIFAR10 adversarial examples
[0.01, 0.02] [0.02, 0.05] [0.05, 0.1] [0.1, 0.25] [0.25, 0.5].
For CIFAR10 examples we show smaller image-perturbation values, since its
classifiers needed smaller perturbations to become confused. All examples
have been computed on the CNN3 classifier. Note, that with BIM, we failed
to create a perturbation in the range of [1, 1.5] for one of the MNIST images.
The images are ordered as following. We have three global columns that
belong to the three attack methods. In each global column we show three
smaller columns, where the first depicts the original images, the second de-
picts the adversarial perturbation, for which we normalize the colors with a
log scale to better show the shape of the perturbations. Finally, the third
small column shows the resulting adversarial examples. Along the rows we
show five rows of three images, where each of the five rows gives adver-
sarial examples with a different image-perturbation. The range of image-
perturbations is shown on the left of each row.
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Figure 5.1: Visualization of adversarial examples of three MNIST images
at different image-perturbations ranges.
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Figure 5.2: Visualization of adversarial examples of three CIFAR10 images
at different image-perturbations ranges.
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We can see that if we have a small enough image-perturbation we barely
notice any change in the adversarial example compared to its original image.
Also, we can observe the difference in the shape of the perturbations among
the three methods of attack. While FGSM and BIM target the entire image
uniformly, DeepFool makes higher perturbations in the middle of the image.
5.2.1 FGSM
The fast gradient method can work in a targeted mode so we examine three
scenarios of its use. A simple untargeted mode, where the attacker only
knows the models predictions and tries to fool them, an untargeted mode,
where the attacker knows the true class labels of the dataset, and the targeted
mode where the attacker tries to make the classifier predict the least-likely
class, Equation (3.3).
We used the parameter values in Table 5.3. These were picked so that
the average image-perturbation values of each run were as evenly scanned as
possible. The same principle was used for selecting parameters of BIM and
DeepFool. Here, the same parameters were used for experiments on both of
the datasets and classifiers.
eps 1255 , 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.05, 0.08, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.8, 1, 1.2
Table 5.3: Values of the eps parameter for the FGSM scan.
In the following sections we show the results for the MNIST and CIFAR10
datasets respectively. We will evaluate classifiers robustness mostly using the
untargeted mode with provided true class labels, because it is the strongest
type of an attack.
MNIST
Because all models have quite high classification accuracy on this dataset,
above 90%, we plot the accuracy computed on the entire dataset (Figures 5.3
to 5.5).
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Figure 5.3: FGSM attack on all neural network type of classifiers for the
MNIST dataset. Left: untargeted mode without supplied true labels. Center:
untargeted mode with supplied true labels. Right: targeted mode using the
least-likely labels.
Looking at the neural network types of classifiers in Figure 5.3, we see
that the attacks using true labels perform most successfully, especially for
the weaker classifiers, like the logistic regression. The curves are slightly
translated up when we don’t provide the attack with the true labels, meaning
that the magnitude of the image perturbation stays mostly the same, but
the accuracy on them is better. This is somewhat misleading since we think
the biggest cause for this translation is the classifiers original classification
accuracy. If we don’t give the attack method a true class label, it samples it
from the models prediction, which can be incorrect. In that case the attacker
will try to move the image away from the false class and most likely towards
the correct one, since its decision boundary is very likely to be the closest to
the false one.
In the case of the least-likely mode, the most notable reduction in the
attackers success is the increase in the image perturbation, which it would
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like to keep as minimal as possible, to reduce the chance of human or machine
detection of the adversarial perturbation. The increase can be observed as
a translation of the curves to the right, compared to the untargeted mode
with supplied true labels. The larger perturbations are present because the
attacker has a harder task than before. If the classifier learned well the
semantic differences present in the data-sets belonging to each class, then the
images with the least-likely class label should be semantically most different
from the attacked image, and the perturbation should then be sufficiently
large to reach that decision boundary.
Regarding the defensive capabilities of the models, we clearly see that
the model with originally the best classification accuracy, CNN4, also had the
highest classification accuracy on adversarial examples, at all sizes of ρ̂adv. At
least for the two untargeted modes. The worst performing models were the
simpler logistic regression and the MLP, whose fall to zero accuracy, as we
increased ρ̂adv, was the most sudden. Roughly looking at the other classifiers
in Figure 5.3, we could conclude that a classifiers initial classification accu-
racy does seem to correlate with its robustness against attacks. This could be
attributed to the models generalization ability to describe the training sets
distribution in the feature space. If the classifiers knowledge of the problem
is better, then it should be harder to confuse it.
Inspecting the RBFN classifiers, the addition of pixel-wise variance infor-
mation proved the most helpful, since we can see that RBFN1var managed
to, at worst, achieve about 0.15 of classification accuracy, in the case of the
strongest untargeted mode with true labels (Figure 5.4).
RBFN1lr performed the worst since it was the first to reach zero accuracy
as we increased the perturbation size. This indicates that updating the orig-
inal centers of the RBF layer that we obtained with K-means doesn’t help
with robustness against adversarial examples. This might not necessarily be
the case, since RBFN2lr performs slightly better. In general it seems that
adding hidden layers helps against FGSM adversarial examples.
In Figure 5.5 we show together the accuracy-perturbation curves of neu-
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Figure 5.4: FGSM attack on all radial basis function network type of clas-
sifiers for the MNIST dataset. Same order of graphs as in Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.5: Accuracy-perturbation plots crafted using the FGSM attack on
the MNIST dataset and selected classification models from the RBFN and
normal neural network type of models. Same order of graphs as in Figure 5.3.
54 CHAPTER 5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
ral network classifiers and radial basis function network classifiers that gave
interesting observations in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. By comparing the two types
of classifiers we see that RBFNs come on top in terms of robustness on ad-
versarial examples, indicating that there might be a case for their natural
resistance against them.
CIFAR10
The CIFAR10 dataset is harder to classify than MNIST. Because of this our
classifiers have a wide range of classification accuracy values, from 41% to
76%. Plotting the classifiers accuracy on the entire adversarially perturbed
dataset isn’t necessarily helpful, since it is harder to compare the relative
changes in the classifiers accuracy. To show relative changes, we only show
curves where their classification accuracy is computed on the subset of images
that were originally classified correctly (Figure 5.6). This way all curves
should meet at 1 if there is no perturbation.
While logistic regression still performs badly, the MLP works better than
on the MNIST dataset (Figure 5.6), its robustness is in the range of CNNs.
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Figure 5.6: FGSM attack on all neural network type of classifiers for the
CIFAR10 dataset. Same order of graphs as in Figure 5.3.
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While some CNNs never fall to Acc=0 and the MLP does, it still needs larger
perturbations to be fooled than logistic regression, whereas in the MNIST
case, both had curves of relatively similar shape and position. Surprisingly,
CNN1 performed as bad as logistic regression, even worse when using the
targeted mode. This conflicts with our assumption that robustness might
be correlated with the generalization ability, since CNN1 is, although a sim-
ple model, still better suited for the task of image recognition than logistic
regression.
Other than CNN1, other classifiers do roughly perform according to their
original classification accuracy. The weaker CNN2 is less robust against ad-
versaries than CNN3 and CNN4. It is harder to pinpoint which of these two
classifiers is better. Their minimums are located roughly in the same posi-
tion. In the ρ̂adv values smaller than their minimums CNN4 performs better,
while among the larger values CNN3 is better.
Among the RBFN types of classifiers, the simplest RBFN1var and RBFN1
are fooled by the largest perturbations, again showing that adding layers or
additionally training the RBF layer doesn’t help (Figure 5.7).
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Figure 5.7: FGSM attack on all RBFN type of classifiers for the CIFAR10
dataset. Same order of graphs as in Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.8: Accuracy-perturbation plots for different classification models
using the FGSM attack on the CIFAR10 dataset. We use the classifica-
tion accuracy on the correctly classified subset. Same order of graphs as in
Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.9: Accuracy-perturbation plots for different classification models
using the FGSM attack on the CIFAR10 dataset. We use the classification
accuracy on the entire data-set. Same order of graphs as in Figure 5.3.
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We show important classifiers from Figures 5.6 and 5.7 together in Fig-
ure 5.8. Again, the RBFN classifiers perform the best, especially the simplest
RBFN1 and RBFN1var, showing that even on a harder dataset, the RBF layer
learns enough information to be successful.
Looking at the untargeted modes in Figure 5.8 we see that the curves are
the same if we provide the attack its true labels or not. To further inspect this
we plot similar results as in Figure 5.8, only now using accuracy calculated on
the entire dataset (Figure 5.9). Now, curves obtained using the untargeted
mode without supplied true labels moved upwards. This confirms that the
only difference in classification comes from the images that were originally
incorrectly classified. These must have been correctly classified after their
perturbation.
5.2.2 BIM
In the experiments using the basic iterative method, we used the param-
eter values in Table 5.4. In the case of the CIFAR10 tests we didn’t use
nb iter = 100, to save time. Also, having eps iter larger than eps makes
no sense, since not even one iteration can be performed. We use the rule
eps iter ≤ eps when constructing the parameter combinations. Also note
that nb iter = 1 was not used, since this is the same as if we used the FGSM
method.
eps 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.05, 0.08, 0.1, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.8, 1
nb iter 2, 5, 10, 20, 30, 50, 100
eps iter 0.001, 0.002, 1255 ,
2
255 , 0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.8
Table 5.4: Values of eps, nb iter, and eps iter parameters for the BIM
scan.
MNIST
In Figure 5.10 we show accuracy-perturbation curves for BIM attacks on
neural network classifiers. Here, the models resistance against adversarial
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Figure 5.10: Accuracy-perturbation plots for MNIST neural network clas-
sifiers, attacked using the basic iterative method. Accuracy was computed
on the correctly classified subset. Top: untargeted mode without supplied
true labels. Center: untargeted mode with supplied true labels. Bottom:
targeted mode using the least-likely labels.
examples does seem to be correlated with their ability to generalize. Look-
ing at the untargeted mode, the logistic regression performs the worst, being
confused by the smallest perturbations, while the originally strongest clas-
sifier CNN4 needs the largest perturbations to get confused. The ordering of
the curves with respect to the models classification accuracy is not perfect.
While CNN3 is a stronger classifier than CNN2 it is easier to confuse, having
its accuracy-perturbation curve more to the left than that of CNN2.
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We also see the difference between the two untargeted modes as with
the fast gradient sign method. Supplying BIM with true labels drops all
curves to zero at high ρ̂adv, while if we don’t supply them, some classifiers
can correctly classify adversarial examples that were incorrectly classified in
their unperturbed state. We can see this with logistic regression (LR).
Comparison of RBFN classifiers is made in Figure 5.11. Here we cut the
heads and tails of the curves, to show their differences better. As in the case
of the FGSM attack, RBFN1var behaves differently than the other models. It
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Figure 5.11: Accuracy-perturbation plots for MNIST RBFN classifiers, at-
tacked using the basic iterative method. Accuracy was computed on the
correctly classified subset. The layout of the graphs is the same as in Fig-
ure 5.10.
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has a steeper drop but never reaches zero accuracy, even when attacked by
the untargeted mode with added true labels. The clean RBFN1 classifier also
performed relatively well. Although its accuracy-perturbation curve reached
zero accuracy, its drop from 1 occurred last. Retraining the RBF layer with
the 2.5-phase learning did not help, its accuracy-perturbation efficiency was
the worst.
We compare important classifier accuracy-perturbation curves from Fig-
ures 5.10 and 5.11 in Figure 5.12. Again RBFN classifiers perform quite well
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Figure 5.12: Accuracy-perturbation plots for selected MNIST classifiers
evaluated in Figures 5.10 and 5.11, attacked using the basic iterative method.
Accuracy was computed on the correctly classified subset. The layout of the
graphs is the same as in Figure 5.10.
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in comparison to convolutional neural networks, even though their original
classification accuracy is not the best. While RBFN1var is the only one to
never reach zero accuracy when increasing the image-perturbation value, the
clean RBFN1 classifier performed just as well as the strongest CNN CNN4.
Again, logistic regression and the MLP behaved arguably the worst in the
case of the untargeted methods while slightly better compared to other clas-
sifiers in the case of the least-likely mode. Interestingly, attacked by the
targeted mode with the least-likely labels, CNN4 performed quite poorly, its
accuracy-perturbation curve dropped to zero even before its curve when using
the two untargeted modes. This is counter-intuitive, since the perturbation
to obtain the least-likely label should be larger that just obtaining the wrong
label.
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Figure 5.13: Accuracy-perturbation plots for CIFAR10 neural network clas-
sifiers, attacked using the basic iterative method. Accuracy was computed
on the correctly classified subset. Top: untargeted mode with supplied true
labels. Bottom: targeted mode using the least-likely labels.
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CIFAR10
BIM attack results in the form of accuracy-perturbation curves are shown
in Figure 5.13 for neural network types of CIFAR10 classifiers. Again, we
calculate the accuracy on the initially correctly classified subset. Because
of this we don’t show results for the untargeted mode with no provided
true labels, since their results give the same classifier rankings in terms of
robustness against adversarial examples.
Here, our assumption, that classifiers that generalize better should also
be more robust against adversarial examples, breaks. The CNN CNN3 that
achieved the highest classification accuracy on the clean test set performed
the worst, while the weak MLP performed the best, having its accuracy-
perturbation curve drop to zero the last. Even logistic regression performed
better than some convolutional neural networks.
In the targeted mode using the least-likely labels logistic regression and
the MLP come on top of convolutional neural networks.
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Figure 5.14: Accuracy-perturbation plots for CIFAR10 RBFN classifiers,
attacked using the basic iterative method. Accuracy was computed on the
correctly classified subset. Left: untargeted mode with supplied true labels.
Right: targeted mode using the least-likely labels.
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Figure 5.15: Accuracy-perturbation plots for selected CIFAR10 neural net-
work and RBFN classifiers from Figures 5.13 and 5.14, attacked using the
basic iterative method. Accuracy was computed on the correctly classified
subset. Left: untargeted mode with supplied true labels. Right: targeted
mode using the least-likely labels.
As usual, among RBFN classifiers the vanilla RBFN1 and the
RBFN1var classifiers perform the most successfully, dropping to zero accu-
racy last (Figure 5.14).
In Figure 5.15 we compare important neural network and RBFN types of
classifiers from Figures 5.13 and 5.14. Again accuracy-perturbation curves
of RBFN models show that these classifiers perform better. Even their worst
classifier RBFN2varlr performed the same as the best performing classifier of
the neural networks, the MLP.
5.2.3 DeepFool
We show the DeepFool parameters used for the ρ̂adv scan in Table 5.5. The
same parameters were used on both datasets and all classifiers.
As in the case of the BIM results explained in (Section 5.2.3), the results
for the DeepFool method are also very scattered, since we are dealing with
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overshoot 1e-4, 1e-3, 1255 , 1e-2, 0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 1
max iter 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 20, 30, 50, 100
Table 5.5: Values of overshoot and max iter params for the DeepFool
scan.
an iterative method again. As before, we add a bottom and top wrapping
to the scatter plot, where the bottom wrap gives us a relation between the
worse case scenario accuracy of the adversarial examples and the image-
perturbation magnitude.
Since DeepFool is implemented as an untargeted method in cleverhans,
it sometimes fails to confuse the classifier on images that were initially mis-
classified, for the same reason as with FGSM and BIM. To perform a better
comparison of the different classifiers robustness we again plot only the ac-
curacy on the subset of initially correctly classified images.
MNIST
Looking at the comparison of the neural network types of classifiers (Fig-
ure 5.16), CNN2 performed the best, even though it was not the strongest
classifier on the clean data-set. The first convolutional network to drop to
zero accuracy was CNN1.
As usual logistic regression performed the worst, having its drop to zero
accuracy already at 0.05 of image perturbation. Again the MLP also didn’t
perform well, since its drop also comes suddenly at a small perturbation.
In general, the hypothesis of needing a good generalizing model stands
here, with the exception of CNN2, which wasn’t originally the best classifier
out of the set.
Most of the RBFN1 classifiers worst-case accuracy-perturbation curves had
a similar shape and position, except for RBFN1lr which performed worse on
the adversaries and RBFN1var which never reached zero prediction accuracy
while its adversarial examples had the smallest perturbation (Figure 5.17).
Again, the model RBFN1var might be so successful since the addition of pixel-
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Figure 5.16: Accuracy-perturbation plots for MNIST neural network clas-
sifiers, attacked using the DeepFool method. Accuracy was computed on the
correctly classified subset.
wise variances allow it to better learn the data-set distribution than a normal
RBFN classifier. The variances cause a large reduction in the feature space
in which the attacker can perturb the image. This is is even more true for
the MNIST dataset since the variance in pixel values is mostly present in the
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Figure 5.17: Accuracy-perturbation plots for MNIST RBFN models, at-
tacked using the DeepFool method. Accuracy was computed on the correctly
classified subset.
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center of the image. The image borders have zero variance and get discarded
when passed trough RBFN1var. If the attacker would perturb these regions it
would achieve nothing, only increase the perturbation size, which it doesn’t
want to do.
Regarding the other RBFN classifiers, additional hidden layers don’t seem
to help, since the vanilla RBFN1 model is on par with RBFN2 and RBFN3.
RBFN1lr performed the worst since it was the first to reach zero accuracy
when increasing the perturbation ρ̂adv. Although continually training the
RBF layer increased the performance on clean images it fails on adversaries.
This might be because we move away from already well established dataset
centers found with K-means.
Comparing vanilla neural networks, CNNs, and RBFNs together (Fig-
ure 5.18) we see that RBFN1 performed the best since it was the last to arrive
at zero accuracy. Although the same could be said for RBFN1var, because
it never arrived at zero. Its only drawback was that its perturbations were
much smaller that those of RBFN1. This puts the two RBFN networks in
front of the other convolutional neural networks, but we do also loose clas-
sification accuracy on clean images if we choose to use them, since they are
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Figure 5.18: Accuracy-perturbation plots for the DeepFool attack on im-
portant MNIST models found by analyzing neural networks and RBFN clas-
sifiers separately. Accuracy was computed on the correctly classified subset.
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not as well suited for image classification as CNNs.
CIFAR10
Interestingly, MLP performed best among the normal neural network types
on the CIFAR10 dataset, even logistic regression isn’t behaving the worst
(Figure 5.19). Again, this is not really in line with our hypothesis calling for
more generalizing classifiers. Whats more, the classifier originally having the
highest classification accuracy, CNN3 performed the worst, being the first to
reach zero accuracy. Of the convolutional neural networks, CNN4dec proved
to be most robust.
The behaviour of radial basis functions was similar to the MNIST clas-
sifiers. Again the simpler RBFN1 and RBFN1var performed best, where the
former came slightly ahead. Adding hidden layers decreased the RBFN mod-
els robustness against adversarial examples, as was the case in the MNIST
dataset (Figure 5.20).
Here the included pixel-wise variances to the RBFN1var model didn’t work
as well as in MNIST dataset, where its accuracy never reached zero. This
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Figure 5.19: Accuracy-perturbation plots for the DeepFool attack on CI-
FAR10 neural network models. Accuracy was computed on the correctly
classified subset.
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Figure 5.20: Accuracy-perturbation plots for the DeepFool attack on CI-
FAR10 radial basis function network models. Accuracy was computed on
the correctly classified subset.
might be because each class of CIFAR10 images contains much more vari-
ances, allowing the attack to move in a larger feature space.
Again, plotting the accuracy-perturbation curves for the important clas-
sifiers from Figures 5.19 and 5.20 together in Figure 5.21 shows a better
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Figure 5.21: Accuracy-perturbation plots for the DeepFool attack on CI-
FAR10 significant RBFN and other neural network classifiers. Accuracy was
computed on the correctly classified subset.
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performance of the RBFN models, at least in terms of DeepFool needing
larger image-perturbations to fool them. Otherwise all models reach zero
accuracy eventually.
DeepFool analysis
In Figure 5.21 we see a characteristic shape of the accuracy-perturbation
curve for each attacked model. A slight curve at the top, following by a
straight drop to zero, where the curve is abruptly cut of. To analyze this
behaviour we chose the curve of CNN4 and performed a series of tests on it.
Firstly, we fixed our different values of max it and plotted separate curves
for them (Figure 5.22). This way we observe quite proper behaviour out of
what seemed randomly scattered points. We observe that by increasing the
maximum number of iterations we allow DeepFool to drastically increase its
attacks performance.
Having more iterations allowed, we notice the curve gets squashed to zero
accuracy. We can also confirm the observation of its authors that DeepFool
more or less finishes in 5 iterations [6], since we can see that with max it
= 5 the curve only has a small kink before landing on acc ∼ 0. The curve
for max it = 10 lays completely on zero accuracy, meaning that having a
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Figure 5.22: DeepFool attacks on the CNN4 classifier. Each curve represents
a fixed max it value whereas overshoot was varied.
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small overshoot is fine as long as we have sufficiently large number of allowed
iterations. From our observations we found max it = 10 is a safe number to
use.
Regarding a suitable value of overshoot, we recommend a natural one
bit value of 1 or 1/255, but max it should be sufficiently large.
The points of each curve in Figure 5.22 were sorted by overshoot, this
way the points were mostly monotonically increasing also in ρ̂adv and we
could join the points with lines. This also shows that there must be a re-
lationship between overshoot and image-perturbation ρ̂adv, which deserves
some attention. We show this in Figure 5.23.
We immediately observe a linear correlation between the two variables.
This is not so surprising since the perturbation η̂ is scaled linearly by
overshoot (Algorithm 3). The only worry is the faster increase in per-
turbation at small values of overshoot, when we have max it 2 and 3. We
suspect this might be caused by the expanding subset of images on which we
calculate the average perturbation ρ̂adv, since we only calculate the image-
perturbation values with successful adversarial examples. The fact that this
increase happens only on smaller numbers of allowed iterations (2 and 3),
leads us to believe that as we increase overshoot more adversarial examples
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Figure 5.23: Correlation between overshoot and ρ̂adv at fixed max it val-
ues. The DeepFool attacks were performed on CNN4.
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are successful and come into the subset. But the images that produced these
new adversaries were harder to fool, so their perturbations must have also
been larger in average. Adding them to the subset naturally increases the
average perturbation ρ̂adv.
Another observation from this increasing overshoot values is that adver-
sarial examples don’t live in high-dimensional “pockets” as Szegedy et. al.
state [3], but actually occupy broad subspaces. This was also observed by
Goodfellow et. al. [4]. They also suggest that this might be the reason why
an adversary misclassified by one classifier has a high probability of being
misclassified by another.
A curiosity is also the loop at the top of the curves. Figure 5.22 shows
that it occurs only at small numbers of allowed iterations, in the case of CNN4
at numbers 1 and 2.
Note that the accuracy in the loop is always decreasing with larger
overshoot, which is to be expected. Larger perturbations are naturally more
capable to bring stronger adversaries. The counterintuitive part that causes
the loop is that the average image-perturbation is initially decreasing. If we
increase overshoot we would expect that the perturbation would increase,
since we are making adversaries more distant from the original images. This
initial decrease can also be observed in Figure 5.23. Again, we suspect that
this is caused by the updated subset of adversaries on which we calculate
the average image-perturbation. Only now smaller perturbations get added
to the subset as we increase overshoot. This seems in contradiction with
our explanation of the sudden increase of ρ̂adv in Figure 5.23, but it is still
viable, since the increase happens at max it of 2 and 5, while the decrease
happens at 1. What might have happened was, that in the first iteration,
some perturbations were too small to be successful, but after scaling them
with overshoot, they move across the decision boundary. This adds smaller
perturbations to the successful subset and decreases the average ρ̂adv.
An outlying classifier regarding the shape of its accuracy-perturbation
curve was RBFN1var (Figure 5.18). Only when we plot it again with sepa-
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Figure 5.24: Left: Curves at fixed max it for the DeepFool attack on the
MNIST classifier RBFN1var. Right: minimum of each curve with respect to
its max it value.
rately fixed max it curves, we don’t see a big difference from the rest (Fig-
ure 5.24). The only change is that its curves never reach zero accuracy, so
the hard cutoff doesn’t happen. DeepFool needs much more iterations to
perform to fool this classifier, again showing that adding pixel-wise variance
information makes the hyperspace of RBFN1var more difficult to navigate for
DeepFool.
Along with the max it curves we also show how fast the curves drop
with increasing max it. We didn’t manage to run the experiment at higher
number of iterations than 100, but we suspect that the method still might
reach zero accuracy, meaning that even RBFN1var can be fooled completely.
The slower performance of DeepFool on the radial basis function network
with variances occurred only with the MNIST dataset though, on CIFAR10
the model behaved similarly to any other RBFN classifier as seen in Fig-
ure 5.20.
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5.2.4 Comparison of the attacks
To compare the methods of attack one to another we compare the attacks
on the CNN4 classifier, for both MNIST and CIFAR10 images. We only use
the “untargeted” mode with supplied true class labels for the FGSM and
BIM. The comparison for the MNIST model is shown in Figure 5.25 and in
Figure 5.26 for CIFAR10, where we calculated the accuracy only on initially
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Figure 5.25: Comparison of FGSM, BIM and DeepFool on the MNIST
classifier CNN4.
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Figure 5.26: Comparison of FGSM, BIM and DeepFool on the CIFAR10
classifier CNN4.
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correctly classified images.
In both cases, for MNIST and CIFAR10, we see the same result. The
strongest method is DeepFool, since it maximally confuses the classifier with
the smallest perturbations. If we compare the minimal image-perturbation
size needed for a method to completely confuse, then we can see that for
MNIST images, the size of the BIM perturbations is almost an order larger
than for DeepFool. FGSM behaves the weakest, since it never maximally
confuses CNN4.
The only advantage that the basic iterative method has over DeepFool is
that its implementation in cleverhans can be run in the “targeted” mode,
so we can either always fool the classifier by giving it the correct class labels,
or perform the “least-likely” class attacks and produce semantically much
different classes compared to correct ones. However, we should note that
DeepFool could also be upgraded to perform in a “targeted” fashion, even
though its authors didn’t do so [6]. When comparing BIM and FGSM we
also see that FGSM performs the same as BIM with only one iteration, since
the FGSM curves lie on top of the top-wrap curves of BIM.
5.3 Adversarial training
We set out to research adversarial training. First we wanted to know better
how to train the networks on adversarial examples. To do this we selected
out MNIST classifier CNN2 that was already trained. This was our starting
point in all of our experiments, where we trained this network further, on
new data. When we further trained the network, we evaluated the accuracy
on clean images and their adversarial examples after each epoch of training.
First we wanted to see what happens to adversarial examples of this clas-
sifier if we train it for more epochs on the original training images. We saved
the adversarial examples of the test set, continued with training and observed
the continually trained classifiers accuracy on them during the epochs. The
adversaries were computed with the DeepFool method (overshoot = 10−2,
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Figure 5.27: Continued training of the MNIST classifier CNN2. We show
its accuracy on the clean test set and their adversarial examples created on
CNN2 with DeepFool before continued training.
max it = 10). The results are shown in Figure 5.27. Accuracy on the clean
images stayed the same, as expected, but interestingly the classifier improved
dramatically on adversarial examples even after the first epoch. We suspect
that this is caused because the perturbations of DeepFool are too small.
When we train the classifier further its discriminating hyperplanes fluctuate
too much around the adversarial examples so they might end up inside them,
still being classified correctly. To test this we try the same experiment but
creating adversaries with BIM, since it creates larger perturbations.
If we evaluate this continued training on adversaries created by BIM
(eps = 0.2, eps iter = 0.05, nb iter = 20), we observe exactly what we
predicted (Figure 5.28). Accuracy only slightly increased on adversarial ex-
amples during the new epochs, while the accuracy on clean images remained
constant, indicating that the size of the perturbations is indeed correlated
with their strength to remain successful after further training.
These results indicate that DeepFool shouldn’t be used in the case of
black-box or even cross-model scenarios. If it fails to confuse even if we
only slightly change the classifiers parameters with continued training, but
keep its architecture fixed, then its small perturbation size isn’t sufficient to
transfer attacks to other classifiers.
Even though we ran the previous experiment with more epochs, 20 instead
of 8, we still couldn’t rely on these results that a sudden jump in accuracy
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Figure 5.28: Continued training of the MNIST classifier CNN2. The ad-
versarial examples have been created on CNN2 with BIM before continued
training.
couldn’t occur after 20 epochs. To make sure that retraining the model
doesn’t improve its robustness against adversarial examples, we created new
adversarial examples after each epoch on the further trained model, and
evaluated the models classification accuracy on this new updated test set.
We show this in Figure 5.29. As predicted, the accuracy stays constant at a
minimal value, meaning that retraining on clean images brings no defensive
improvement.
Moving to adversarial training, we perturbed half of the clean train set
images with BIM which uses the initial CNN2 model, and continued to train
in on this new dataset. In Figure 5.30 we show the accuracy during the
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Figure 5.29: Continued training, the accuracy is evaluated on adversarial
examples that were updated after each epoch.
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Figure 5.30: Continued training on half of clean images and half of ad-
versarial examples created before retraining. Left: accuracy on clean images
during training. Center: accuracy on the adversarially perturbed test im-
ages created before training. Right: accuracy on the test set adversarially
perturbed after each epoch.
epochs on clean test images, adversaries constructed before training and on
the adversaries that were updated after each epoch. The adversaries cre-
ated before training immediately fail, already after the first epoch, which
is somewhat promising if we ignored the results on the updated adversarial
examples. There the classifier fails to defend, since the accuracy remained
at virtually zero. We also observe a slight drop in the classification accuracy
on clean images, which might be the consequence of a changed dataset.
Unfortunately the results show that adversarial training cannot be exe-
cuted by creating adversarial examples only once, before training. We inspect
if it would be helpful if we update the training set with new adversarial ex-
amples after each epoch. Although, updating all adversarial examples in the
training set would take too much time, so we tried to update only a few after
each epoch. To be more specific, after each epoch was over, we selected n
clean images and n adversarial images in the train set. We converted the
clean images into adversarial using the newly trained model, while turning
the selected adversarial images back into their original clean images. With
this method we hoped that we would obtain a more dynamic training set
that would adapt to the trained classifier.
We show the results in Figure 5.31. As usual we split the training set
into 50% clean and 50% adversarial images, we used two values for n, the
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Figure 5.31: Continued training on the training set that was updated with
new adversarial examples after each epoch.
first was set so that we updated 20% of each subset, and 50% for the second.
As usual the accuracy on clean images stayed constant, but we see a success
in the accuracy on the updated adversarial examples. Although the defense
is not perfect, it is an indicator that adversarial training is doing its job and
that the model is becoming more robust. Between the two values of n we
see no significant change, so this percentage of updated images is not very
important.
The CNN2 MNIST classifier has also been trained on the updated training
set using the DeepFool method (Figure 5.32). Here we updated 50% of the
clean and adversarial images each epoch. The results are different to those
of BIM. The neural network didn’t become very robust against adversarial
examples constructed on it. We only see a slight increase in the overall ac-
curacy. There are some spikes present that lifted the accuracy to the order
of 10−1, but these are rare and their immediate drop shows their unreliabil-
ity. We suspect that this is caused by the difference in implementation of
BIM and DeepFool. While BIM always constructed perturbations of similar
magnitude, DeepFool didn’t. DeepFool searches for the classifiers decision
boundaries, so when we train the network with the adversarial examples,
its boundaries move, and most likely expand and encircle the adversaries.
When we construct new examples, DeepFool finds the expanded boundaries
and produces larger perturbations, thus still obtains a good error rate. We
confirm this growth of magnitude during training in Figure 5.32, where we
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Figure 5.32: Learning curve for the continued training on the training set
that was updated after each epoch using DeepFool.
show the image-perturbation ρ̂adv of newly constructed adversarial examples
for each epoch.
To find out how much more robust are the adversarially trained classifiers,
we show their accuracy-perturbation curves in comparison to their original
versions. We also show a cross-model attack scenario, where we either always
construct adversarial examples with the original classifier, trained on clean
images, or we construct them with its adversarially trained version.
First we compare the classifier CNN2 and its adversarially trained version
using the basic iterative method, the version where we updated 20% of im-
ages each epoch (Figure 5.31). We name this classifier CNN2advBIM. The
comparison of the accuracy-perturbation plots is shown in Figure 5.33. We
constructed the curve with the basic iterative method, as CNN2advBIM was
trained with it.
We see that the newly trained classifier became more robust than its
original. In both Figure 5.33.a and Figure 5.33.b we see its curve translated
much more to the right, showing that it needs larger perturbations to get
confused. It needs even larger perturbations to get fooled if we construct
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Figure 5.33: Cross-model attacks between the normal MNIST classifier
CNN2 and its adversarially trained variant CNN2advBIM. The adversarial ex-
amples were computed with BIM. Top: adversarial examples computed on
each classifier separately. Center: examples computed on CNN2. Bottom:
examples computed on CNN2advBIM.
examples with the original model (Figure 5.33.b).
Its original CNN2 performed slightly better on the cross-model attack
where we constructed adversarial examples with CNN2advBIM for both classi-
fiers, Figure 5.33.c, which isn’t too surprising. If we attack CNN2advBIM with
adversarial examples tailored specifically for it then it isn’t too shocking that
any other classifier behaves better on them.
We also show the cross-model attack results using the MNIST CNN2 clas-
sifier and its version adversarially trained using the DeepFool method, as
discussed above. We call the new classifier CNN2advDF and show the results
in Figure 5.34. Remember, the network never achieved good classification
accuracy on newly computed adversarial examples, but we did notice a in-
crease in the image-perturbation size of the new examples. This increase
of the necessary perturbations brought a more robust model, as CNN2advDF
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Figure 5.34: Cross-model attacks between the normal MNIST classifier
CNN2 and its adversarially trained variant CNN2advDF. The adversarial exam-
ples were computed with DeepFool. Top: adversarial examples computed
on each classifier separately. Center: examples computed on CNN2. Bottom:
examples computed on CNN2advDF.
requires higher perturbations to fool it than its original CNN2 (Figure 5.34.a).
The robustness of CNN2advDF increased differently to its variant trained with
BIM CNN2advBIM. While it did similarly in the sense that it became more
robust to adversarial examples created on itself, compared to how robust
CNN2 is on its own examples (Figure 5.34.a), the difference here is that it
actually became practically invulnerable to adversarial examples created on
its original model CNN2 (Figure 5.34.b), while CNN2 had the upper edge when
comparing them on adversaries computed with CNN2advDF (Figure 5.34.c).
We also adversarially trained the CIFAR10 CNN3 classifier using the basic
iterative method, creating the model CNN3advBIM, and using DeepFool, cre-
ating CNN3advDF. We show their accuracy-perturbation curves for the cross-
model scenario attacks versus their original CNN3 in Figures 5.35 and 5.36.
Here we show the accuracy on initially correctly predicted images, since we
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Figure 5.35: Cross-model attacks between the normal CIFAR10 classifier
CNN3 and its adversarially trained variant CNN3advBIM. The adversarial ex-
amples were computed with BIM. Top: adversarial examples computed on
each classifier separately. Center: examples computed on CNN3. Bottom:
examples computed on CNN3advBIM.
are dealing with CIFAR10 classifiers.
Interestingly, the BIM trained model became fully resistant to its own
adversarial examples, while still performing better on examples created with
CNN3 (Figure 5.35).
While CNN3advDF wasn’t immune to its own adversarial examples (Fig-
ure 5.36), we see improvements similar to the DeepFool trained MNIST clas-
sifier (Figure 5.34).
It is also important to show how adversarial training impacts the clas-
sifiers capabilities on clean images. In Table 5.6 we show the classification
accuracy of the adversarially trained models, discussed above, along with the
accuracy of their original models CNN2, for MNIST, and CNN3 for CIFAR10.
We saw a slight decrease in the classification accuracy, which implies
that we need to do a trade-off between the classifiers accuracy on clean and
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Figure 5.36: Cross-model attacks between the normal CIFAR10 classifier
CNN3 and its adversarially trained variant CNN3advDF. The adversarial exam-
ples were computed with DeepFool. Top: adversarial examples computed
on each classifier separately. Center: examples computed on CNN3. Bottom:
examples computed on CNN3advDF.
Original model Acc. Adversarially trained model Acc.
CNN2 (MNIST) 99.21% CNN2advBIM 99.07%
CNN2advDF 98.66%
CNN3 (CIFAR10) 76.65% CNN3advBIM 70.59%
CNN3advDF 70.62%
Table 5.6: Adversarial classification accuracy (Acc.) of classifiers and their
adversarially trained variants on clean images. The CNN2 classifier and its
variants were run on the MNIST dataset, while CNN3 ran on the CIFAR10
dataset.
adversarially perturbed images. In most cases, misclassifying a additional
percentage point of clean images is probably better than misclassifying all
adversarial examples that were fed to our implementation with the intent to
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cause harm.
On the other hand, there have been results [4, 6] where, with difficulty,
adversarial training behaved as a type of regularization technique and in-
creased the models accuracy.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
Usually the methods of constructing adversarial examples use several dif-
ferent parameters that dictate the construction of adversarial examples. A
different set of parameters can give stronger but more perturbed adversarial
examples, or less perturbed and also weaker ones. Researchers usually stick
with one set of parameters for each method of attack [4, 5, 6], but an optimal
set of parameters is usually hard to determine. Even in the simplest case of
the fast gradient sign method, where we control only the eps parameter, we
need to choose a point of trade-off between the attacks error rate and the
size of the perturbations. This makes it harder to compare different methods
if we only compare results for one set of parameters for each attack method.
In this work we introduce a novel accuracy-perturbation plot used for
the evaluation of a classifiers robustness against methods of adversarial at-
tacks. With these plots we obtain a type of “efficiency curve” of a method,
independent of it parameters, that gives us an evaluation of how successful a
classifier is on adversarial examples at a certain perturbation. This allowed us
to perform in-depth evaluations of an adversarial attack method on a specific
classifier. Along with the definition of the plot we also implemented a wrap-
ping algorithm which gave us an easier comparison of accuracy-perturbation
plots that had a highly scattered nature. With these curves we compared the
FGSM, BIM and the DeepFool method of generating adversarial examples,
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evaluated on different types of classifiers. These included logistic regression,
a multilayer perceptron, different convolutional neural networks and radial
basis function networks. Because of the different combinations of attack
methods and classifier models we needed to evaluate, we had a very high
number of different experiments. Because of this, the total time we needed
to compute the results was almost three weeks, not counting failed attempts.
We confirm that adversarial examples are easy to generate, even the sim-
ple one-step FGSM can almost always confuse a classifier when given a suf-
ficient eps. Our accuracy-perturbation plots correctly show that DeepFool
manages to fool the classifiers with much smaller perturbations than FGSM
and BIM. Also, the linearity as a source of adversarial examples states that
with higher-dimensional images we need smaller perturbations to confuse the
classifier. This seems to be true, since the image-perturbation values needed
to fool the CIFAR10 classifiers have been smaller than those of MNIST clas-
sifiers and MNIST images have a smaller dimension than CIFAR10 images.
Among the different types of classifiers we used, logistic regression usu-
ally performed the worst. We presumed that a classifiers robustness against
adversarial examples would correlate with its generalization ability, but we
have not found sufficient proof for this claim. While stronger convolutional
networks usually performed much better than logistic regression for example,
this was usually true for MNIST classifiers. We ran into inconsistencies with
CIFAR10 classifiers, where a simple MLP was one of the top performers,
even though it performed poorly on clean images. This inconsistency from
the CIFAR10 dataset might stem from the fact that all our classifiers didn’t
perform very well even on initial clean images, achieving at most 76% clas-
sification accuracy. This might make these classifiers harder to compare. A
good idea would be to use stronger classifiers and observe if their accuracy-
perturbation curves behaved better.
We also found that while the radial basis function types of networks aren’t
well suited for image classification, and performed worse on clean images than
CNNs, they showed an intrinsic property that allowed them to perform well
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on adversarial attacks. At least as well as the top performing convolutional
neural networks, sometimes even better. This property is attributed to its
reliance on distances from its center images, where it becomes less certain of
a prediction if the input is farther away from the center images.
We also inspected adversarial training as a type of defense. We found that
it is necessary to construct new adversarial examples during training, if we
want to achieve improvement in the classifiers robustness against the attacks.
Our accuracy-perturbation plots showed that adversarially trained classifiers
performed better than their original models trained on clean images, needing
more adversarially perturbed images to get fooled. Previous work reported
a regularization property to adversarial training, increasing the classifiers
classification accuracy on clean images. We did not see such results as our
newly trained classifiers always performed worse than their originals.
The accuracy-perturbation curves showed to be useful at comparing how
our classifiers handle different magnitudes of perturbed adversarial examples.
This method could also be further expanded in other use cases. For example,
instead of calculating the average accuracy and image-perturbation on the
entire dataset, we could show these plots for a specific class. This could help
us find weak-points in the classifier, showing us on which class the classifier
needs smaller perturbations to confuse it.
Also, sometimes it can be hard to determine the more robust classifier
out of their accuracy-perturbation curves, if they overlap or intersect. It
would be a good idea to try to design a measure from the curve similar
to the F-measure of a precision-recall curve. For example, we could report
the image-perturbation value of the point when the classifiers accuracy falls
below a certain value. This way we could set an allowed minimal classi-
fication accuracy limit for our models and compare them according to the
perturbation magnitudes needed to drop their accuracy below this limit. We
could also determine visually the minimal image-perturbation that humans
can perceive and give an estimate of the classification error rate the classifier
obtains on adversarial example of this image-perturbation value. This would
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give a good evaluation of the attack methods successfulness.
Either way, we have found accuracy-perturbation curves to be a valuable
tool in assessing the robustness of classification models, so we think they
could be a useful tool in the further research regarding adversarial attacks
and methods towards the defense against them.
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